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Description
I'm not very familiar with how TPMs work, but reading around I got the impression that ideally you'd take "ownership" of the TPM by setting owner, endorsement, and lockout passwords, e.g. with tss2 provision
which also creates a new SRK.
Presumably, systemd-cryptenroll can then use this SRK without prompting for owner authorization; in other words I can run systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-public-key=/etc/systemd/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem --tpm2-device=auto /dev/disk/by-partlabel/linux-root
to bind LUKS to a TPM policy without being prompted for the owner password.
With ssh-tpm-agent however, I need to provide the owner password every time I generate a key, and I also need to put the owner password into the environment for the agent process, which perhaps sort of defeats the purpose of the owner password in the first place?
Is this intended?