|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: Authorization Flow |
| 3 | +--- |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +Authorization in smart accounts is determined by matching the current context against the account's context rules. Rules are gathered, ordered by recency, and evaluated until one satisfies the requirements. If a matching rule is found, its policies (if any) are enforced. Otherwise, authorization fails. |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +## Detailed Flow |
| 8 | +```mermaid |
| 9 | +sequenceDiagram |
| 10 | + participant User |
| 11 | + participant SmartAccount |
| 12 | + participant ContextRule |
| 13 | + participant DelegatedSigner |
| 14 | + participant Verifier |
| 15 | + participant Policy |
| 16 | +
|
| 17 | + User->>SmartAccount: Signatures |
| 18 | + SmartAccount->>ContextRule: Match context<br/>(CallContract, Default, ...) |
| 19 | + ContextRule->>ContextRule: Filter expired rules<br/>Sort newest first |
| 20 | +
|
| 21 | + loop Each rule until match |
| 22 | + Note over ContextRule,DelegatedSigner: Built-in authorization <br/>for delegated signers |
| 23 | + ContextRule->>DelegatedSigner: require_auth_for_args() |
| 24 | + DelegatedSigner-->>ContextRule: Authorized |
| 25 | +
|
| 26 | + Note over ContextRule,Verifier: Signature verification for external signers |
| 27 | + ContextRule->>Verifier: verify() |
| 28 | + Verifier-->>ContextRule: Valid |
| 29 | +
|
| 30 | + Note over ContextRule,Policy: Policy pre-checks |
| 31 | + ContextRule->>Policy: can_enforce() |
| 32 | + Policy-->>ContextRule: True/False |
| 33 | +
|
| 34 | + alt All checks pass |
| 35 | + ContextRule->>Policy: enforce() |
| 36 | + Policy->>Policy: Update state |
| 37 | + ContextRule-->>SmartAccount: ✓ Authorized |
| 38 | + else Any check fails |
| 39 | + ContextRule->>ContextRule: Try next rule |
| 40 | + end |
| 41 | + end |
| 42 | +
|
| 43 | + SmartAccount-->>User: Success |
| 44 | +``` |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | +### 1. Rule Collection |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +The smart account gathers all relevant context rules for evaluation: |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | +- Retrieve all non-expired rules for the specific context type |
| 51 | +- Include default rules that apply to any context |
| 52 | +- Sort specific and default rules by creation time (newest first) |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | +**Context Type Matching:** |
| 55 | +- For a `CallContract(address)` context, both specific `CallContract(address)` rules and `Default` rules are collected |
| 56 | +- For a `CreateContract(wasm_hash)` context, both specific `CreateContract(wasm_hash)` rules and `Default` rules are collected |
| 57 | +- For any other context, only `Default` rules are collected |
| 58 | + |
| 59 | +**Expiration Filtering:** |
| 60 | +Rules with `valid_until` set to a ledger sequence that has passed are automatically filtered out during collection. |
| 61 | + |
| 62 | +### 2. Rule Evaluation |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +For each rule in order (newest and most specific first): |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +#### Step 2.1: Signer Filtering |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +Extract authenticated signers from the rule's signer list. A signer is considered authenticated if: |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | +- **Delegated Signer**: The address has authorized the operation via `require_auth_for_args(payload)` |
| 71 | +- **External Signer**: The verifier contract confirms the signature is valid for the public key |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | +Only authenticated signers proceed to the next step. |
| 74 | + |
| 75 | +#### Step 2.2: Policy Validation |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | +If the rule has attached policies, verify that all can be enforced: |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +```rust |
| 80 | +for policy in rule.policies { |
| 81 | + if !policy.can_enforce(e, account, rule_id, signers, auth_context) { |
| 82 | + // This rule fails, try the next rule |
| 83 | + } |
| 84 | +} |
| 85 | +``` |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +If any policy's `can_enforce()` returns false, the rule fails and evaluation moves to the next rule. |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +#### Step 2.3: Authorization Check |
| 90 | + |
| 91 | +The authorization check depends on whether policies are present: |
| 92 | + |
| 93 | +**With Policies:** |
| 94 | +- Success if all policies passed `can_enforce()` |
| 95 | +- The presence of authenticated signers is verified during policy evaluation |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | +**Without Policies:** |
| 98 | +- Success if all signers in the rule are authenticated |
| 99 | +- At least one signer must be authenticated for the rule to match |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | +#### Step 2.4: Rule Precedence |
| 102 | + |
| 103 | +The first matching rule wins. Newer rules take precedence over older rules for the same context type. This allows overwriting old rules. |
| 104 | + |
| 105 | +### 3. Policy Enforcement |
| 106 | + |
| 107 | +If authorization succeeds, the smart account calls `enforce()` on all matched policies in order: |
| 108 | + |
| 109 | +```rust |
| 110 | +for policy in matched_rule.policies { |
| 111 | + policy.enforce(e, account, rule_id, signers, auth_context); |
| 112 | +} |
| 113 | +``` |
| 114 | + |
| 115 | +This triggers any necessary state changes such as updating spending counters, recording timestamps, emitting audit events, or modifying allowances. |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +Policy enforcement requires the smart account's authorization, ensuring that policies can only be enforced by the account itself. |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | +### 4. Result |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | +**Success:** Authorization is granted and the transaction proceeds. All policy state changes are committed. |
| 122 | + |
| 123 | +**Failure:** Authorization is denied and the transaction reverts. No state changes are committed. |
| 124 | + |
| 125 | +## Examples |
| 126 | + |
| 127 | +### Specific Context with Policy |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | +**Configuration:** |
| 130 | +```rust |
| 131 | +// DEX-specific rule with session key and spending limit |
| 132 | +ContextRule { |
| 133 | + id: 2, |
| 134 | + context_type: CallContract(dex_address), |
| 135 | + valid_until: Some(current_ledger + 24_hours), |
| 136 | + signers: [passkey], |
| 137 | + policies: [spending_limit_policy] |
| 138 | +} |
| 139 | + |
| 140 | +// Default admin rule |
| 141 | +ContextRule { |
| 142 | + id: 1, |
| 143 | + context_type: Default, |
| 144 | + signers: [ed25519_alice, ed25519_bob], |
| 145 | + policies: [] |
| 146 | +} |
| 147 | +``` |
| 148 | + |
| 149 | +**Call Context:** `CallContract(dex_address)` |
| 150 | + |
| 151 | +**Authorization Entries:** `[passkey_signature]` |
| 152 | + |
| 153 | +**Flow:** |
| 154 | +1. Collect: Rules 2 (specific) and 1 (default) |
| 155 | +2. Evaluate Rule 2: |
| 156 | + - Signer filtering: Passkey authenticated |
| 157 | + - Policy validation: Spending limit check passes |
| 158 | + - Authorization check: All policies enforceable → Success |
| 159 | +3. Enforce: Update spending counters, emit events |
| 160 | +4. Result: Authorized |
| 161 | + |
| 162 | +If the spending limit had been exceeded, Rule 2 would fail and evaluation would continue to Rule 1 (which would also fail since the passkey doesn't match Alice or Bob). |
| 163 | + |
| 164 | +### Fallback to Default |
| 165 | + |
| 166 | +**Configuration:** |
| 167 | +```rust |
| 168 | +// Session rule (expired) |
| 169 | +ContextRule { |
| 170 | + id: 2, |
| 171 | + context_type: CallContract(dex_address), |
| 172 | + valid_until: Some(current_ledger - 100), // Expired |
| 173 | + signers: [session_key], |
| 174 | + policies: [spending_limit_policy] |
| 175 | +} |
| 176 | + |
| 177 | +// Default admin rule |
| 178 | +ContextRule { |
| 179 | + id: 1, |
| 180 | + context_type: Default, |
| 181 | + signers: [ed25519_alice, ed25519_bob], |
| 182 | + policies: [] |
| 183 | +} |
| 184 | +``` |
| 185 | + |
| 186 | +**Call Context:** `CallContract(dex_address)` |
| 187 | + |
| 188 | +**Authorization Entries:** `[ed25519_alice_signature, ed25519_bob_signature]` |
| 189 | + |
| 190 | +**Flow:** |
| 191 | +1. Collect: Rule 2 filtered out (expired), only Rule 1 collected |
| 192 | +2. Evaluate Rule 1: Both Alice and Bob authenticated → Success |
| 193 | +3. Enforce: No policies to enforce |
| 194 | +4. Result: Authorized |
| 195 | + |
| 196 | +The expired session rule is automatically filtered out, and authorization falls back to the default admin rule. |
| 197 | + |
| 198 | +### Authorization Failure |
| 199 | + |
| 200 | +**Configuration:** |
| 201 | +```rust |
| 202 | +// Default rule requiring 2-of-3 threshold |
| 203 | +ContextRule { |
| 204 | + id: 1, |
| 205 | + context_type: Default, |
| 206 | + signers: [alice, bob, carol], |
| 207 | + policies: [threshold_policy(2)] |
| 208 | +} |
| 209 | +``` |
| 210 | + |
| 211 | +**Call Context:** `CallContract(any_address)` |
| 212 | + |
| 213 | +**Authorization Entries:** `[alice_signature]` |
| 214 | + |
| 215 | +**Flow:** |
| 216 | +1. Collect: Default rule retrieved |
| 217 | +2. Evaluate: |
| 218 | + - Signer filtering: Only Alice authenticated |
| 219 | + - Policy validation: Threshold policy requires 2 signers, only 1 present → Fail |
| 220 | +3. No more rules to evaluate |
| 221 | +4. Result: Denied (transaction reverts) |
| 222 | + |
| 223 | +## Performance Considerations |
| 224 | + |
| 225 | +Protocol 23 optimizations make the authorization flow efficient: |
| 226 | +- **Marginal storage read costs**: Reading multiple context rules has negligible cost |
| 227 | +- **Cheaper cross-contract calls**: Calling verifiers and policies is substantially cheaper |
| 228 | + |
| 229 | +The framework enforces limits to maintain predictability: |
| 230 | +- Maximum context rules per smart account: 15 |
| 231 | +- Maximum signers per context rule: 15 |
| 232 | +- Maximum policies per context rule: 5 |
| 233 | + |
| 234 | +## See Also |
| 235 | + |
| 236 | +- [Smart Account](/stellar-contracts/accounts/smart-account) |
| 237 | +- [Context Rules](/stellar-contracts/accounts/context-rules) |
| 238 | +- [Signers and Verifiers](/stellar-contracts/accounts/signers-and-verifiers) |
| 239 | +- [Policies](/stellar-contracts/accounts/policies) |
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