Fix CVE-2024-1086.

	netfilter: nf_tables: reject QUEUE/DROP verdict parameters

	This reverts commit e0abdad.

	core.c:nf_hook_slow assumes that the upper 16 bits of NF_DROP
	verdicts contain a valid errno, i.e. -EPERM, -EHOSTUNREACH or similar,
	or 0.

	Due to the reverted commit, its possible to provide a positive
	value, e.g. NF_ACCEPT (1), which results in use-after-free.

	Its not clear to me why this commit was made.

	NF_QUEUE is not used by nftables; "queue" rules in nftables
	will result in use of "nft_queue" expression.

	If we later need to allow specifiying errno values from userspace
	(do not know why), this has to call NF_DROP_GETERR and check that
	"err <= 0" holds true.

	Fixes: e0abdad ("netfilter: nf_tables: accept QUEUE/DROP verdict parameters")
	Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
	Reported-by: Notselwyn <notselwyn@pwning.tech>
	Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
	Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Back-ported from upstream commit: f342de4

Author: Florian Westphal

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c

@@ -9713,16 +9713,10 @@ static int nft_verdict_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_data *data,
 	data->verdict.code = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_VERDICT_CODE]));
 
 	switch (data->verdict.code) {
-	default:
-		switch (data->verdict.code & NF_VERDICT_MASK) {
-		case NF_ACCEPT:
-		case NF_DROP:
-		case NF_QUEUE:
-			break;
-		default:
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		fallthrough;
+	case NF_ACCEPT:
+	case NF_DROP:
+	case NF_QUEUE:
+		break;
 	case NFT_CONTINUE:
 	case NFT_BREAK:
 	case NFT_RETURN:
@@ -9756,6 +9750,8 @@ static int nft_verdict_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_data *data,
 		chain->use++;
 		data->verdict.chain = chain;
 		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	desc->len = sizeof(data->verdict);