diff --git a/website/i18n/de/docusaurus-plugin-content-docs/current/About/Rewards.md b/website/i18n/de/docusaurus-plugin-content-docs/current/About/Rewards.md
index b101da8a..838ac0d5 100644
--- a/website/i18n/de/docusaurus-plugin-content-docs/current/About/Rewards.md
+++ b/website/i18n/de/docusaurus-plugin-content-docs/current/About/Rewards.md
@@ -27,3 +27,5 @@ This address could be a hardware wallet, a software wallet, or even a multi-sig
 [MEV](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/mev/), or "maximal extractable value", is a controversial topic. Node operators can extract MEV by accepting blocks built by "searchers", via a small side program called ["mev-boost"](https://ethresear.ch/t/mev-boost-merge-ready-flashbots-architecture/11177) by Flashbots. In this case, the CL ... Consensus Layer client such as Nimbus, Teku, &c ... will, when asked to procure a block to propose, get blocks from MEV relays via mev-boost and from the EL ... Execution Layer client such as Besu, Geth, &c ... and then choose whichever block from the relay pays best. The EL does not currently communicate its expected payout and would only be chosen when the relay offers no block. For this, the relay has to be trusted to deliver valid blocks.
 
 Rewards from MEV are paid to the same `--suggested-fee-recipient` address that priority fees go to.
+
+The `-min-bid` flag allows setting a minimum bid value for MEV blocks. You can find this flag in `.env` file as `MEV_MIN_BID` (e.g. 0,.05). If left empty, no minimum bid is set. This means that if the relay bids offer less than 0.05 ETH in rewards, MEV-Boost will not choose those bids and will instead produce blocks locally. Overall, this setting will help to decentralize block building, as it will make it less likely that an external block builder is chosen when the profit is low.