Update auto-generated files

Author: Matt Corallo

src/main/java/org/ldk/impl/bindings.java

@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ static APIError constr_from_ptr(long ptr) {
 		if (raw_val.getClass() == bindings.LDKAPIError.MonitorUpdateFailed.class) {
 			return new MonitorUpdateFailed(ptr, (bindings.LDKAPIError.MonitorUpdateFailed)raw_val);
 		}
+		if (raw_val.getClass() == bindings.LDKAPIError.IncompatibleShutdownScript.class) {
+			return new IncompatibleShutdownScript(ptr, (bindings.LDKAPIError.IncompatibleShutdownScript)raw_val);
+		}
 		assert false; return null; // Unreachable without extending the (internal) bindings interface
 	}
 
@@ -89,6 +92,19 @@ private MonitorUpdateFailed(long ptr, bindings.LDKAPIError.MonitorUpdateFailed o
 			super(null, ptr);
 		}
 	}
+	public final static class IncompatibleShutdownScript extends APIError {
+		/**
+		 * The incompatible shutdown script.
+		*/
+		public final ShutdownScript script;
+		private IncompatibleShutdownScript(long ptr, bindings.LDKAPIError.IncompatibleShutdownScript obj) {
+			super(null, ptr);
+			long script = obj.script;
+			ShutdownScript script_hu_conv = new ShutdownScript(null, script);
+			script_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+			this.script = script_hu_conv;
+		}
+	}
 	/**
 	 * Creates a copy of the APIError
 	 */
@@ -155,4 +171,16 @@ public static APIError monitor_update_failed() {
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Utility method to constructs a new IncompatibleShutdownScript-variant APIError
+	 */
+	public static APIError incompatible_shutdown_script(ShutdownScript script) {
+		long ret = bindings.APIError_incompatible_shutdown_script(script == null ? 0 : script.ptr & ~1);
+		if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
+		APIError ret_hu_conv = APIError.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(script);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
 }

src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/APIError.java

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
  * then there is a risk of channels force-closing on startup when the manager realizes it's
  * outdated. However, as long as `ChannelMonitor` backups are sound, no funds besides those used
  * for unilateral chain closure fees are at risk.
+ * BackgroundProcessor will immediately stop on drop. It should be stored until shutdown.
  */
 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
 public class BackgroundProcessor extends CommonBase {
@@ -33,21 +34,25 @@ protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
 	}
 
 	/**
-	 * Start a background thread that takes care of responsibilities enumerated in the top-level
-	 * documentation.
+	 * Start a background thread that takes care of responsibilities enumerated in the [top-level
+	 * documentation].
 	 * 
-	 * If `persist_manager` returns an error, then this thread will return said error (and
-	 * `start()` will need to be called again to restart the `BackgroundProcessor`). Users should
-	 * wait on [`thread_handle`]'s `join()` method to be able to tell if and when an error is
-	 * returned, or implement `persist_manager` such that an error is never returned to the
-	 * `BackgroundProcessor`
+	 * The thread runs indefinitely unless the object is dropped, [`stop`] is called, or
+	 * `persist_manager` returns an error. In case of an error, the error is retrieved by calling
+	 * either [`join`] or [`stop`].
+	 * 
+	 * Typically, users should either implement [`ChannelManagerPersister`] to never return an
+	 * error or call [`join`] and handle any error that may arise. For the latter case, the
+	 * `BackgroundProcessor` must be restarted by calling `start` again after handling the error.
 	 * 
 	 * `persist_manager` is responsible for writing out the [`ChannelManager`] to disk, and/or
 	 * uploading to one or more backup services. See [`ChannelManager::write`] for writing out a
 	 * [`ChannelManager`]. See [`FilesystemPersister::persist_manager`] for Rust-Lightning's
 	 * provided implementation.
 	 * 
-	 * [`thread_handle`]: BackgroundProcessor::thread_handle
+	 * [top-level documentation]: Self
+	 * [`join`]: Self::join
+	 * [`stop`]: Self::stop
 	 * [`ChannelManager`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
 	 * [`ChannelManager::write`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager#impl-Writeable
 	 * [`FilesystemPersister::persist_manager`]: lightning_persister::FilesystemPersister::persist_manager
@@ -67,7 +72,42 @@ public static BackgroundProcessor start(ChannelManagerPersister persister, Event
 	}
 
 	/**
-	 * Stop `BackgroundProcessor`'s thread.
+	 * Join `BackgroundProcessor`'s thread, returning any error that occurred while persisting
+	 * [`ChannelManager`].
+	 * 
+	 * # Panics
+	 * 
+	 * This function panics if the background thread has panicked such as while persisting or
+	 * handling events.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelManager`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneErrorZ join() {
+		long ret = bindings.BackgroundProcessor_join(this.ptr);
+		if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		this.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		// Due to rust's strict-ownership memory model, in some cases we need to "move"
+		// an object to pass exclusive ownership to the function being called.
+		// In most cases, we avoid this being visible in GC'd languages by cloning the object
+		// at the FFI layer, creating a new object which Rust can claim ownership of
+		// However, in some cases (eg here), there is no way to clone an object, and thus
+		// we actually have to pass full ownership to Rust.
+		// Thus, after this call, this is reset to null and is now a dummy object.
+		this.ptr = 0;
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Stop `BackgroundProcessor`'s thread, returning any error that occurred while persisting
+	 * [`ChannelManager`].
+	 * 
+	 * # Panics
+	 * 
+	 * This function panics if the background thread has panicked such as while persisting or
+	 * handling events.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelManager`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
 	 */
 	public Result_NoneErrorZ stop() {
 		long ret = bindings.BackgroundProcessor_stop(this.ptr);

src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/BackgroundProcessor.java

@@ -203,11 +203,111 @@ public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
 		bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
+	 * small to claim on-chain.
+	 * 
+	 * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
+	 * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
+	 * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
+	 * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
+	 * channel is force-closed.
+	 * 
+	 * This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+	 * exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
+	 * sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
+	 * important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
+	 */
+	public long get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this.ptr);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
+	 * small to claim on-chain.
+	 * 
+	 * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
+	 * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
+	 * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
+	 * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
+	 * channel is force-closed.
+	 * 
+	 * This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+	 * exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
+	 * sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
+	 * important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
+	 */
+	public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(long val) {
+		bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this.ptr, val);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
+	 * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
+	 * 
+	 * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
+	 * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
+	 * funder/initiator.
+	 * 
+	 * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
+	 * acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+	 * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
+	 * [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+	 * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
+	 * funds.
+	 * 
+	 * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
+	 * [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+	 * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 */
+	public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
+	 * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
+	 * 
+	 * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
+	 * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
+	 * funder/initiator.
+	 * 
+	 * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
+	 * acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+	 * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
+	 * [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+	 * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
+	 * funds.
+	 * 
+	 * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
+	 * [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+	 * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 */
+	public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
+		bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
 	 */
-	public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
+	public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
 		if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
 		ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);

src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java

@@ -164,7 +164,19 @@ public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
 	 * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 	 * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 	 * 
+	 * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+	 * estimate.
+	 * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+	 * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+	 * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+	 * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+	 * 
 	 * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
 	 */
 	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
@@ -173,6 +185,34 @@ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+	 * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+	 * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+	 * 
+	 * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+	 * the channel being closed or not:
+	 * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+	 * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+	 * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+	 * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+	 * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+	 * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+	 * 
+	 * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, channel_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+		if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 	 * the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
@@ -243,6 +283,32 @@ public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_h
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+	 * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+	 * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+	 * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+	 * never reach the recipient.
+	 * 
+	 * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
+	 * 
+	 * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+	 * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
+	 * 
+	 * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+	 * 
+	 * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+	 */
+	public Result_PaymentHashPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_preimage);
+		if (ret < 1024) { return null; }
+		Result_PaymentHashPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentHashPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
 	 * 
@@ -308,13 +374,16 @@ public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() {
 	}
 
 	/**
-	 * If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
-	 * After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
-	 * to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
+	 * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
 	 * 
-	 * This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
+	 * This currently includes:
+	 * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
+	 * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
+	 * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
+	 * the channel.
 	 * 
-	 * Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
+	 * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
+	 * estimate fetches.
 	 */
 	public void timer_tick_occurred() {
 		bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr);
@@ -427,7 +496,7 @@ public TwoTuple<byte[], byte[]> create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msa
 	 * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
 	 * method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
 	 * 
-	 * `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
+	 * `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
 	 * allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
 	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
 	 * copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
@@ -461,7 +530,7 @@ public TwoTuple<byte[], byte[]> create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msa
 	 * 
 	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
 	 * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
-	 * [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
+	 * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
 	 */
 	public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, long user_payment_id) {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, payment_hash, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id);