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jira VULN-164 cve CVE-2022-3565 commit-author Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> commit 2568a7e The l1oip_cleanup() traverses the l1oip_ilist and calls release_card() to cleanup module and stack. However, release_card() calls del_timer() to delete the timers such as keep_tl and timeout_tl. If the timer handler is running, the del_timer() will not stop it and result in UAF bugs. One of the processes is shown below: (cleanup routine) | (timer handler) release_card() | l1oip_timeout() ... | del_timer() | ... ... | kfree(hc) //FREE | | hc->timeout_on = 0 //USE Fix by calling del_timer_sync() in release_card(), which makes sure the timer handlers have finished before the resources, such as l1oip and so on, have been deallocated. What's more, the hc->workq and hc->socket_thread can kick those timers right back in. We add a bool flag to show if card is released. Then, check this flag in hc->workq and hc->socket_thread. Fixes: 3712b42 ("Add layer1 over IP support") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 2568a7e) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-409 cve CVE-2023-39198 commit-author Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com> commit c611589 qxl_mode_dumb_create() dereferences the qobj returned by qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle(), but the handle is the only one holding a reference to it. A potential attacker could guess the returned handle value and closes it between the return of qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle() and the qobj usage, triggering a use-after-free scenario. Reproducer: int dri_fd =-1; struct drm_mode_create_dumb arg = {0}; void gem_close(int handle); void* trigger(void* ptr) { int ret; arg.width = arg.height = 0x20; arg.bpp = 32; ret = ioctl(dri_fd, DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB, &arg); if(ret) { perror("[*] DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB Failed"); exit(-1); } gem_close(arg.handle); while(1) { struct drm_mode_create_dumb args = {0}; args.width = args.height = 0x20; args.bpp = 32; ret = ioctl(dri_fd, DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB, &args); if (ret) { perror("[*] DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB Failed"); exit(-1); } printf("[*] DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB created, %d\n", args.handle); gem_close(args.handle); } return NULL; } void gem_close(int handle) { struct drm_gem_close args; args.handle = handle; int ret = ioctl(dri_fd, DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE, &args); // gem close handle if (!ret) printf("gem close handle %d\n", args.handle); } int main(void) { dri_fd= open("/dev/dri/card0", O_RDWR); printf("fd:%d\n", dri_fd); if(dri_fd == -1) return -1; pthread_t tid1; if(pthread_create(&tid1,NULL,trigger,NULL)){ perror("[*] thread_create tid1\n"); return -1; } while (1) { gem_close(arg.handle); } return 0; } This is a KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x3c2/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:69 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88801136c240 by task poc/515 CPU: 1 PID: 515 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-4 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:319 print_report+0xd2/0x660 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:430 kasan_report+0xd2/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:536 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x30 linux/mm/kasan/report_generic.c:383 qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x3c2/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:69 drm_mode_create_dumb linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:96 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x1f5/0x2d0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:102 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x21d/0x430 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0x56f/0xcc0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:51 __do_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:870 __se_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13d/0x1c0 linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x90 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7ff5004ff5f7 Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 99 c8 0d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 69 c8 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff500408ea8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff5004ff5f7 RDX: 00007ff500408ec0 RSI: 00000000c02064b2 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff500408ef0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000002a R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00007fff1c6cdafe R13: 00007fff1c6cdaff R14: 00007ff500408fc0 R15: 0000000000802000 </TASK> Allocated by task 515: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1e/0x40 linux/mm/kasan/generic.c:510 ____kasan_kmalloc linux/mm/kasan/common.c:374 __kasan_kmalloc+0xc3/0xd0 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc linux/./include/linux/kasan.h:196 kmalloc_trace+0x48/0xc0 linux/mm/slab_common.c:1066 kmalloc linux/./include/linux/slab.h:580 kzalloc linux/./include/linux/slab.h:720 qxl_bo_create+0x11a/0x610 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_object.c:124 qxl_gem_object_create+0xd9/0x360 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:58 qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle+0xa1/0x180 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:89 qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x1cd/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:63 drm_mode_create_dumb linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:96 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x1f5/0x2d0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:102 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x21d/0x430 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0x56f/0xcc0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:51 __do_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:870 __se_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13d/0x1c0 linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x90 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 Freed by task 515: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x60 linux/mm/kasan/generic.c:521 ____kasan_slab_free linux/mm/kasan/common.c:236 ____kasan_slab_free+0x180/0x1f0 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:200 __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x30 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free linux/./include/linux/kasan.h:162 slab_free_hook linux/mm/slub.c:1781 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xd2/0x1a0 linux/mm/slub.c:1807 slab_free linux/mm/slub.c:3787 __kmem_cache_free+0x196/0x2d0 linux/mm/slub.c:3800 kfree+0x78/0x120 linux/mm/slab_common.c:1019 qxl_ttm_bo_destroy+0x140/0x1a0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_object.c:49 ttm_bo_release+0x678/0xa30 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:381 kref_put linux/./include/linux/kref.h:65 ttm_bo_put+0x50/0x80 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:393 qxl_gem_object_free+0x3e/0x60 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:42 drm_gem_object_free+0x5c/0x90 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:974 kref_put linux/./include/linux/kref.h:65 __drm_gem_object_put linux/./include/drm/drm_gem.h:431 drm_gem_object_put linux/./include/drm/drm_gem.h:444 qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle+0x151/0x180 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:100 qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x1cd/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:63 drm_mode_create_dumb linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:96 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x1f5/0x2d0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:102 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x21d/0x430 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0x56f/0xcc0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:51 __do_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:870 __se_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13d/0x1c0 linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x90 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801136c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 576 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88801136c000, ffff88801136c400) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:0000000089fc329b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11368 head:0000000089fc329b order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffff888007841dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801136c100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88801136c180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88801136c200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88801136c280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88801136c300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Instead of returning a weak reference to the qxl_bo object, return the created drm_gem_object and let the caller decrement the reference count when it no longer needs it. As a convenience, if the caller is not interested in the gobj object, it can pass NULL to the parameter and the reference counting is descremented internally. The bug and the reproducer were originally found by the Zero Day Initiative project (ZDI-CAN-20940). Link: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/ Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230814165119.90847-1-wander@redhat.com (cherry picked from commit c611589) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-473 cve CVE-2023-51780 commit-author Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> commit 24e90b9 Because do_vcc_ioctl() accesses sk->sk_receive_queue without holding a sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, it can cause a race with vcc_recvmsg(). A use-after-free for skb occurs with the following flow. ``` do_vcc_ioctl() -> skb_peek() vcc_recvmsg() -> skb_recv_datagram() -> skb_free_datagram() ``` Add sk->sk_receive_queue.lock to do_vcc_ioctl() to fix this issue. Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231209094210.GA403126@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 24e90b9) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-465 cve CVE-2023-51779 commit-author Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> commit 2e07e83 upstream-diff We are missing f4b41f0 ("net: remove noblock parameter from skb_recv_datagram()") commit. The patch is clean otherwise. This can cause a race with bt_sock_ioctl() because bt_sock_recvmsg() gets the skb from sk->sk_receive_queue and then frees it without holding lock_sock. A use-after-free for a skb occurs with the following flow. ``` bt_sock_recvmsg() -> skb_recv_datagram() -> skb_free_datagram() bt_sock_ioctl() -> skb_peek() ``` Add lock_sock to bt_sock_recvmsg() to fix this issue. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 2e07e83) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-329 cve CVE-2023-28464 commit-author ZhengHan Wang <wzhmmmmm@gmail.com> commit a85fb91 syzbot reports a slab use-after-free in hci_conn_hash_flush [1]. After releasing an object using hci_conn_del_sysfs in the hci_conn_cleanup function, releasing the same object again using the hci_dev_put and hci_conn_put functions causes a double free. Here's a simplified flow: hci_conn_del_sysfs: hci_dev_put put_device kobject_put kref_put kobject_release kobject_cleanup kfree_const kfree(name) hci_dev_put: ... kfree(name) hci_conn_put: put_device ... kfree(name) This patch drop the hci_dev_put and hci_conn_put function call in hci_conn_cleanup function, because the object is freed in hci_conn_del_sysfs function. This patch also fixes the refcounting in hci_conn_add_sysfs() and hci_conn_del_sysfs() to take into account device_add() failures. This fixes CVE-2023-28464. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1bb51491ca5df96a5f724899d1dbb87afda61419 [1] Signed-off-by: ZhengHan Wang <wzhmmmmm@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit a85fb91) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-679 cve CVE-2023-6622 commit-author Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> commit 3701cd3 If dynset expressions provided by userspace is larger than the declared set expressions, then bail out. Fixes: 48b0ae0 ("netfilter: nftables: netlink support for several set element expressions") Reported-by: Xingyuan Mo <hdthky0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> (cherry picked from commit 3701cd3) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-703 cve CVE-2023-6932 commit-author Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> commit e2b706c When I perform the following test operations: 1.ip link add br0 type bridge 2.brctl addif br0 eth0 3.ip addr add 239.0.0.1/32 dev eth0 4.ip addr add 239.0.0.1/32 dev br0 5.ip addr add 224.0.0.1/32 dev br0 6.while ((1)) do ifconfig br0 up ifconfig br0 down done 7.send IGMPv2 query packets to port eth0 continuously. For example, ./mausezahn ethX -c 0 "01 00 5e 00 00 01 00 72 19 88 aa 02 08 00 45 00 00 1c 00 01 00 00 01 02 0e 7f c0 a8 0a b7 e0 00 00 01 11 64 ee 9b 00 00 00 00" The preceding tests may trigger the refcnt uaf issue of the mc list. The stack is as follows: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 144 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:25) CPU: 21 PID: 144 Comm: ksoftirqd/21 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.7.0-rc1-next-20231117-dirty ctrliq#80 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:25) RSP: 0018:ffffb68f00657910 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8a00c3bf96c0 RCX: ffff8a07b6160908 RDX: 00000000ffffffd8 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8a07b6160900 RBP: ffff8a00cba36862 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff R10: ffffb68f006577c0 R11: ffffffffb0fdcdc8 R12: ffff8a00c3bf9680 R13: ffff8a00c3bf96f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8a00d8766e00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a07b6140000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f10b520b28 CR3: 000000039741a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> igmp_heard_query (net/ipv4/igmp.c:1068) igmp_rcv (net/ipv4/igmp.c:1132) ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205) ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5529) netif_receive_skb_internal (net/core/dev.c:5729) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:5788) br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:216) nf_hook_bridge_pre (net/bridge/br_input.c:294) __netif_receive_skb_core (net/core/dev.c:5423) __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5606) __netif_receive_skb_list (net/core/dev.c:5674) netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5764) napi_gro_receive (net/core/gro.c:609) e1000_clean_rx_irq (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4467) e1000_clean (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3805) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6533) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6735) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:554) run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:913) smpboot_thread_fn (kernel/smpboot.c:164) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:250) </TASK> The root causes are as follows: Thread A Thread B ... netif_receive_skb br_dev_stop ... br_multicast_leave_snoopers ... __ip_mc_dec_group ... __igmp_group_dropped igmp_rcv igmp_stop_timer igmp_heard_query //ref = 1 ip_ma_put igmp_mod_timer refcount_dec_and_test igmp_start_timer //ref = 0 ... refcount_inc //ref increases from 0 When the device receives an IGMPv2 Query message, it starts the timer immediately, regardless of whether the device is running. If the device is down and has left the multicast group, it will cause the mc list refcount uaf issue. Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit e2b706c) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-20 cve CVE-2019-15505 commit-author Sean Young <sean@mess.org> commit 0c4df39 Ensure we do not access the buffer beyond the end if no 0xff byte is encountered. Reported-by: syzbot+eaaaf38a95427be88f4b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 0c4df39) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <ppatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-XXXX cve CVE-2025-1234 commit 1234567890abcde1234567890abcde1234567890 This isn't a real commit Do i dont have to say anything here
This github actions checks the PR commits for references to upstream linux commits (lines starting with "commit <hash>") and does two things: 1. Checks that this hash exists in the upstream linux kernel history 2. Checks if there are any Fixes: references for the referenced commit in the upstream linux kernel history If either of those are found to be true a comment is added to the PR with the pertinent information
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This patch enables support for DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_CALL_OPS on RISC-V. This allows each ftrace callsite to provide an ftrace_ops to the common ftrace trampoline, allowing each callsite to invoke distinct tracer functions without the need to fall back to list processing or to allocate custom trampolines for each callsite. This significantly speeds up cases where multiple distinct trace functions are used and callsites are mostly traced by a single tracer. The idea and most of the implementation is taken from the ARM64's implementation of the same feature. The idea is to place a pointer to the ftrace_ops as a literal at a fixed offset from the function entry point, which can be recovered by the common ftrace trampoline. We use -fpatchable-function-entry to reserve 8 bytes above the function entry by emitting 2 4 byte or 4 2 byte nops depending on the presence of CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C. These 8 bytes are patched at runtime with a pointer to the associated ftrace_ops for that callsite. Functions are aligned to 8 bytes to make sure that the accesses to this literal are atomic. This approach allows for directly invoking ftrace_ops::func even for ftrace_ops which are dynamically-allocated (or part of a module), without going via ftrace_ops_list_func. We've benchamrked this with the ftrace_ops sample module on Spacemit K1 Jupiter: Without this patch: baseline (Linux rivos 6.14.0-09584-g7d06015d936c #3 SMP Sat Mar 29 +-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------+ | Number of tracers | Total time (ns) | Per-call average time | |-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------| | Relevant | Irrelevant | 100000 calls | Total (ns) | Overhead (ns) | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 0 | 0 | 1357958 | 13 | - | | 0 | 1 | 1302375 | 13 | - | | 0 | 2 | 1302375 | 13 | - | | 0 | 10 | 1379084 | 13 | - | | 0 | 100 | 1302458 | 13 | - | | 0 | 200 | 1302333 | 13 | - | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 13677833 | 136 | 123 | | 1 | 1 | 18500916 | 185 | 172 | | 1 | 2 | 2285645 | 228 | 215 | | 1 | 10 | 58824709 | 588 | 575 | | 1 | 100 | 505141584 | 5051 | 5038 | | 1 | 200 | 1580473126 | 15804 | 15791 | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 13561000 | 135 | 122 | | 2 | 0 | 19707292 | 197 | 184 | | 10 | 0 | 67774750 | 677 | 664 | | 100 | 0 | 714123125 | 7141 | 7128 | | 200 | 0 | 1918065668 | 19180 | 19167 | +----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------+ Note: per-call overhead is estimated relative to the baseline case with 0 relevant tracers and 0 irrelevant tracers. With this patch: v4-rc4 (Linux rivos 6.14.0-09598-gd75747611c93 #4 SMP Sat Mar 29 +-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------+ | Number of tracers | Total time (ns) | Per-call average time | |-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------| | Relevant | Irrelevant | 100000 calls | Total (ns) | Overhead (ns) | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 0 | 0 | 1459917 | 14 | - | | 0 | 1 | 1408000 | 14 | - | | 0 | 2 | 1383792 | 13 | - | | 0 | 10 | 1430709 | 14 | - | | 0 | 100 | 1383791 | 13 | - | | 0 | 200 | 1383750 | 13 | - | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 5238041 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 1 | 5228542 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 2 | 5325917 | 53 | 40 | | 1 | 10 | 5299667 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 100 | 5245250 | 52 | 39 | | 1 | 200 | 5238459 | 52 | 39 | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 5239083 | 52 | 38 | | 2 | 0 | 19449417 | 194 | 181 | | 10 | 0 | 67718584 | 677 | 663 | | 100 | 0 | 709840708 | 7098 | 7085 | | 200 | 0 | 2203580626 | 22035 | 22022 | +----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------+ Note: per-call overhead is estimated relative to the baseline case with 0 relevant tracers and 0 irrelevant tracers. As can be seen from the above: a) Whenever there is a single relevant tracer function associated with a tracee, the overhead of invoking the tracer is constant, and does not scale with the number of tracers which are *not* associated with that tracee. b) The overhead for a single relevant tracer has dropped to ~1/3 of the overhead prior to this series (from 122ns to 38ns). This is largely due to permitting calls to dynamically-allocated ftrace_ops without going through ftrace_ops_list_func. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> [update kconfig, asm, refactor] Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com> Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407180838.42877-10-andybnac@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-93830 commit 053f3ff Author: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed Apr 2 10:44:03 2025 -0500 net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty ctrliq#8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mamatha Inamdar <minamdar@redhat.com>
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MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/src/kernel/centos-stream-9/-/merge_requests/6946 Description: Updates for ibmveth pool store JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-93830 Build Info: https://brewweb.engineering.redhat.com/brew/taskinfo?taskID=67820140 Tested: Verified Brew build test kernel RPMs and confirmed issue is resovled Signed-off-by: Mamatha Inamdar <minamdar@redhat.com> commit 053f3ff Author: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed Apr 2 10:44:03 2025 -0500 net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty ctrliq#8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mamatha Inamdar <minamdar@redhat.com> Approved-by: Steve Best <sbest@redhat.com> Approved-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com> Approved-by: CKI KWF Bot <cki-ci-bot+kwf-gitlab-com@redhat.com> Merged-by: Augusto Caringi <acaringi@redhat.com>
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Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs. After that commit, the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop() has been called. This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver .suspend() method being invoked twice. The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend() call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer: (NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en] RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re] Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070 R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en] bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en] ? __schedule+0x514/0xf50 process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400 worker_thread+0x11c/0x260 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xfe/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag is already set. This will preserve the original symmetrical bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start(). Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition. And for symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set. Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver") Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com> Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613231841.377988-2-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) ctrliq#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) ctrliq#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c98cc97 upstream. Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f ctrliq#551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f ctrliq#551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-65718 Upstream status: Linus Conflicts: In mm/shmem.c there were 3 rejects: 1) hunk #5 due to missing upstream commit a2e4595 ("shmem: stable directory offsets") which added a call to function simple_offset_add() which is not added. 2) hunk ctrliq#9 due to existing CentOS Stream commit 79e59ae ("shmem: convert to ctime accessor functions") which required the hunk to be applied manually. 3) hunk ctrliq#10 due to missing Upstream commit 0c95c02 ("fs: drop unused posix acl handlers") which needed to be applied manually to allow for the differences. Also in mm/shmem.c there was a fuzz 2 in hunk #4 due to a white space difference and fuzz 2 in hunk #6 due to existing CentOS Stream commit 79e59ae ("shmem: convert to ctime accessor functions"). commit 2daf18a Author: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Date: Tue Aug 8 21:33:56 2023 -0700 tmpfs,xattr: enable limited user extended attributes Enable "user." extended attributes on tmpfs, limiting them by tracking the space they occupy, and deducting that space from the limited ispace (unless tmpfs mounted with nr_inodes=0 to leave that ispace unlimited). tmpfs inodes and simple xattrs are both unswappable, and have to be in lowmem on a 32-bit highmem kernel: so the ispace limit is appropriate for xattrs, without any need for a further mount option. Add simple_xattr_space() to give approximate but deterministic estimate of the space taken up by each xattr: with simple_xattrs_free() outputting the space freed if required (but kernfs and even some tmpfs usages do not require that, so don't waste time on strlen'ing if not needed). Security and trusted xattrs were already supported: for consistency and simplicity, account them from the same pool; though there's a small risk that a tmpfs with enough space before would now be considered too small. When extended attributes are used, "df -i" does show more IUsed and less IFree than can be explained by the inodes: document that (manpage later). xfstests tests/generic which were not run on tmpfs before but now pass: 020 037 062 070 077 097 103 117 337 377 454 486 523 533 611 618 728 with no new failures. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Message-Id: <2e63b26e-df46-5baa-c7d6-f9a8dd3282c5@google.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <ikent@redhat.com>
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…cal section JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-87008 commit 85b2b9c Author: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 15:26:52 -0800 locking/semaphore: Use wake_q to wake up processes outside lock critical section A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
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Symbolize stack traces by creating a live machine. Add this
functionality to dump_stack and switch dump_stack users to use
it. Switch TUI to use it. Add stack traces to the child test function
which can be useful to diagnose blocked code.
Example output:
```
$ perf test -vv PERF_RECORD_
...
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Running (1 active)
^C
Signal (2) while running tests.
Terminating tests with the same signal
Internal test harness failure. Completing any started tests:
: 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
---- unexpected signal (2) ----
#0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0
#1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#2 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64
#3 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72
#4 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26
#5 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55
#6 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0
#7 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0
ctrliq#8 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127
ctrliq#9 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0
ctrliq#10 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0
ctrliq#11 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0
ctrliq#12 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
ctrliq#13 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0
ctrliq#14 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
ctrliq#15 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
ctrliq#16 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0
---- unexpected signal (2) ----
#0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0
#1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#2 0x7fc12fea3a14 in pthread_sigmask@GLIBC_2.2.5 pthread_sigmask.c:45
#3 0x7fc12fe49fd9 in __GI___sigprocmask sigprocmask.c:26
#4 0x7fc12ff2601b in __longjmp_chk longjmp.c:36
#5 0x55788c6210c0 in print_test_result.isra.0 builtin-test.c:0
#6 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#7 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64
ctrliq#8 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72
ctrliq#9 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26
ctrliq#10 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55
ctrliq#11 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0
ctrliq#12 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0
ctrliq#13 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127
ctrliq#14 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0
ctrliq#15 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0
ctrliq#16 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0
ctrliq#17 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
ctrliq#18 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0
ctrliq#19 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
ctrliq#20 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
ctrliq#21 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions)
```
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250624210500.2121303-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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Calling perf top with branch filters enabled on Intel CPU's
with branch counters logging (A.K.A LBR event logging [1]) support
results in a segfault.
$ perf top -e '{cpu_core/cpu-cycles/,cpu_core/event=0xc6,umask=0x3,frontend=0x11,name=frontend_retired_dsb_miss/}' -j any,counter
...
Thread 27 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 0x7fffafff76c0 (LWP 949003)]
perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653
653 *width = env->cpu_pmu_caps ? env->br_cntr_width :
(gdb) bt
#0 perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653
#1 0x00000000005b1599 in symbol__account_br_cntr (branch=0x7fffcc3db580, evsel=0xfea2d0, offset=12, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:345
#2 0x00000000005b17fb in symbol__account_cycles (addr=5658172, start=5658160, sym=0x7fffcc0ee420, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:389
#3 0x00000000005b1976 in addr_map_symbol__account_cycles (ams=0x7fffcd7b01d0, start=0x7fffcd7b02b0, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:422
#4 0x000000000068d57f in hist__account_cycles (bs=0x110d288, al=0x7fffafff6540, sample=0x7fffafff6760, nonany_branch_mode=false, total_cycles=0x0, evsel=0xfea2d0) at util/hist.c:2850
#5 0x0000000000446216 in hist_iter__top_callback (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, single=true, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:737
#6 0x0000000000689787 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at util/hist.c:1359
#7 0x0000000000446710 in perf_event__process_sample (tool=0x7fffffff9e00, event=0x110d250, evsel=0xfea2d0, sample=0x7fffafff6760, machine=0x108c968) at builtin-top.c:845
ctrliq#8 0x0000000000447735 in deliver_event (qe=0x7fffffffa120, qevent=0x10fc200) at builtin-top.c:1211
ctrliq#9 0x000000000064ccae in do_flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
ctrliq#10 0x000000000064d005 in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
ctrliq#11 0x000000000064d0ef in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:342
ctrliq#12 0x00000000004472a9 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:1120
ctrliq#13 0x00007ffff6e7dba8 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:448
ctrliq#14 0x00007ffff6f01b8c in __GI___clone3 () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78
The cause is that perf_env__find_br_cntr_info tries to access a
null pointer pmu_caps in the perf_env struct. A similar issue exists
for homogeneous core systems which use the cpu_pmu_caps structure.
Fix this by populating cpu_pmu_caps and pmu_caps structures with
values from sysfs when calling perf top with branch stack sampling
enabled.
[1], LBR event logging introduced here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231025201626.3000228-5-kan.liang@linux.intel.com/
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon <thomas.falcon@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612163659.1357950-2-thomas.falcon@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-15711 Upstream status: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER; tdh_vp_enter() needs to be noinstr because VM entry in KVM is noinstr as well, which is for two reasons: * marking the area as CT_STATE_GUEST via guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff() * IRET must be avoided between VM-exit and NMI handling, in order to avoid prematurely releasing the NMI inhibit. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLs in several ways: it uses more arguments, and after it returns some host state may need to be restored. Therefore tdh_vp_enter() uses __seamcall_saved_ret() instead of __seamcall_ret(); since it is the only caller of __seamcall_saved_ret(), it can be made noinstr also. TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Message-ID: <20241121201448.36170-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 69e23fa) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-95318 commit c5b6aba Author: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Date: Mon May 12 14:04:02 2025 -0400 locking/mutex: implement mutex_trylock_nested Despite the fact that several lockdep-related checks are skipped when calling trylock* versions of the locking primitives, for example mutex_trylock, each time the mutex is acquired, a held_lock is still placed onto the lockdep stack by __lock_acquire() which is called regardless of whether the trylock* or regular locking API was used. This means that if the caller successfully acquires more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH locks of the same class, even when using mutex_trylock, lockdep will still complain that the maximum depth of the held lock stack has been reached and disable itself. For example, the following error currently occurs in the ARM version of KVM, once the code tries to lock all vCPUs of a VM configured with more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs, a situation that can easily happen on modern systems, where having more than 48 CPUs is common, and it's also common to run VMs that have vCPU counts approaching that number: [ 328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! [ 328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report [ 328.187531] depth: 48 max: 48! [ 328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664: [ 328.194957] #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0 [ 328.204048] #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.212521] #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.220991] #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.229463] #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.237934] #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.246405] #6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 Luckily, in all instances that require locking all vCPUs, the 'kvm->lock' is taken a priori, and that fact makes it possible to use the little known feature of lockdep, called a 'nest_lock', to avoid this warning and subsequent lockdep self-disablement. The action of 'nested lock' being provided to lockdep's lock_acquire(), causes the lockdep to detect that the top of the held lock stack contains a lock of the same class and then increment its reference counter instead of pushing a new held_lock item onto that stack. See __lock_acquire for more information. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Message-ID: <20250512180407.659015-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-95318 commit b586c5d Author: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Date: Mon May 12 14:04:06 2025 -0400 KVM: arm64: use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus when locking all vCPUs Use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus instead of a custom implementation when locking all vCPUs of a VM, to avoid triggering a lockdep warning, in the case in which the VM is configured to have more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs. This fixes the following false lockdep warning: [ 328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! [ 328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report [ 328.187531] depth: 48 max: 48! [ 328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664: [ 328.194957] #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0 [ 328.204048] #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.212521] #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.220991] #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.229463] #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.237934] #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.246405] #6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Message-ID: <20250512180407.659015-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-72226 JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-73517 CVE: CVE-2025-21674 Upstream-status: v6.13 commit 2c36880 Author: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Date: Wed Jan 15 13:39:08 2025 +0200 net/mlx5e: Fix inversion dependency warning while enabling IPsec tunnel Attempt to enable IPsec packet offload in tunnel mode in debug kernel generates the following kernel panic, which is happening due to two issues: 1. In SA add section, the should be _bh() variant when marking SA mode. 2. There is not needed flush_workqueue in SA delete routine. It is not needed as at this stage as it is removed from SADB and the running work will be canceled later in SA free. ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 6.12.0+ #4 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- charon/1337 [HC0[0]:SC0[4]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire: ffff88810f365020 (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] and this task is already holding: ffff88813e0f0d48 (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: xfrm_state_delete+0x16/0x30 which would create a new lock dependency: (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} -> (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_timer_handler+0x91/0xd70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1dd/0xa60 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x146/0x2e0 handle_softirqs+0x266/0x860 irq_exit_rcu+0x115/0x1a0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 default_idle+0x13/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2da/0x320 cpu_startup_entry+0x50/0x60 start_secondary+0x213/0x2a0 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 xa_set_mark+0x70/0x110 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xe48/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&xa->xa_lock#24); local_irq_disable(); lock(&x->lock); lock(&xa->xa_lock#24); <Interrupt> lock(&x->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by charon/1337: #0: ffffffff87f8f858 (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x5e/0x90 #1: ffff88813e0f0d48 (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: xfrm_state_delete+0x16/0x30 the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock: -> (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} ops: 29 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_alloc_spi+0xc0/0xe60 xfrm_alloc_userspi+0x5f6/0xbc0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_timer_handler+0x91/0xd70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1dd/0xa60 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x146/0x2e0 handle_softirqs+0x266/0x860 irq_exit_rcu+0x115/0x1a0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 default_idle+0x13/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2da/0x320 cpu_startup_entry+0x50/0x60 start_secondary+0x213/0x2a0 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_alloc_spi+0xc0/0xe60 xfrm_alloc_userspi+0x5f6/0xbc0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 } ... key at: [<ffffffff87f9cd20>] __key.18+0x0/0x40 the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: -> (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} ops: 9 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xc5b/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 xa_set_mark+0x70/0x110 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xe48/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xc5b/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 } ... key at: [<ffffffffa078ff60>] __key.48+0x0/0xfffffffffff210a0 [mlx5_core] ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x30a0/0x5040 lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_delete+0x90/0x160 __xfrm_state_delete+0x662/0xae0 xfrm_state_delete+0x1e/0x30 xfrm_del_sa+0x1c2/0x340 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1337 Comm: charon Not tainted 6.12.0+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xd0 check_irq_usage+0x12e8/0x1d90 ? print_shortest_lock_dependencies_backwards+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 ? __lockdep_reset_lock+0x180/0x180 ? check_path.constprop.0+0x24/0x50 ? mark_lock+0x108/0x2fb0 ? print_circular_bug+0x9b0/0x9b0 ? mark_lock+0x108/0x2fb0 ? print_usage_bug.part.0+0x670/0x670 ? check_prev_add+0x1c4/0x2310 check_prev_add+0x1c4/0x2310 __lock_acquire+0x30a0/0x5040 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 ? mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? __xfrm_state_delete+0x5f0/0xae0 ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 ? mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_delete+0x90/0x160 __xfrm_state_delete+0x662/0xae0 xfrm_state_delete+0x1e/0x30 xfrm_del_sa+0x1c2/0x340 ? xfrm_get_sa+0x250/0x250 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 ? copy_sec_ctx+0x270/0x270 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 ? copy_sec_ctx+0x270/0x270 ? netlink_ack+0xd90/0xd90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xb60 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 ? netlink_attachskb+0x730/0x730 ? lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 ? netlink_unicast+0x740/0x740 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x740/0x740 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ? fdget+0x163/0x1d0 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x856/0xe30 ? lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 ? __task_pid_nr_ns+0x117/0x410 ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f7d31291ba4 Code: 7d e8 89 4d d4 e8 4c 42 f7 ff 44 8b 4d d0 4c 8b 45 c8 89 c3 44 8b 55 d4 8b 7d e8 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 55 d8 48 8b 75 e0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 34 89 df 48 89 45 e8 e8 99 42 f7 ff 48 8b 45 RSP: 002b:00007f7d2ccd94f0 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f7d31291ba4 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00007f7d2ccd96a0 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 00007f7d2ccd9530 R08: 00007f7d2ccd9598 R09: 000000000000000c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000028 R13: 00007f7d2ccd9598 R14: 00007f7d2ccd96a0 R15: 00000000000000e1 </TASK> Fixes: 4c24272 ("net/mlx5e: Listen to ARP events to update IPsec L2 headers in tunnel mode") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@redhat.com>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-71129 upstream ======== commit ea04fe1 Author: Aditya Bodkhe <aditya.b1@linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue Apr 29 12:21:32 2025 +0530 description =========== pert script tests fails with segmentation fault as below: 92: perf script tests: --- start --- test child forked, pid 103769 DB test [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.7rbftEpOzX/perf.data (9 samples) ] /usr/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell/script.sh: line 35: 103780 Segmentation fault (core dumped) perf script -i "${perfdatafile}" -s "${db_test}" --- Cleaning up --- ---- end(-1) ---- 92: perf script tests : FAILED! Backtrace pointed to : #0 0x0000000010247dd0 in maps.machine () #1 0x00000000101d178c in db_export.sample () #2 0x00000000103412c8 in python_process_event () #3 0x000000001004eb28 in process_sample_event () #4 0x000000001024fcd0 in machines.deliver_event () #5 0x000000001025005c in perf_session.deliver_event () #6 0x00000000102568b0 in __ordered_events__flush.part.0 () #7 0x0000000010251618 in perf_session.process_events () ctrliq#8 0x0000000010053620 in cmd_script () ctrliq#9 0x00000000100b5a28 in run_builtin () ctrliq#10 0x00000000100b5f94 in handle_internal_command () ctrliq#11 0x0000000010011114 in main () Further investigation reveals that this occurs in the `perf script tests`, because it uses `db_test.py` script. This script sets `perf_db_export_mode = True`. With `perf_db_export_mode` enabled, if a sample originates from a hypervisor, perf doesn't set maps for "[H]" sample in the code. Consequently, `al->maps` remains NULL when `maps__machine(al->maps)` is called from `db_export__sample`. As al->maps can be NULL in case of Hypervisor samples , use thread->maps because even for Hypervisor sample, machine should exist. If we don't have machine for some reason, return -1 to avoid segmentation fault. Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Aditya Bodkhe <aditya.b1@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250429065132.36839-1-adityab1@linux.ibm.com Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Brnak <jbrnak@redhat.com>
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commit f7fa852 upstream. Add the SM6115 MDSS compatible to clients compatible list, as it also needs that workaround. Without this workaround, for example, QRB4210 RB2 which is based on SM4250/SM6115 generates a lot of smmu unhandled context faults during boot: arm_smmu_context_fault: 116854 callbacks suppressed arm-smmu c600000.iommu: Unhandled context fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x5c0ec600, fsynr=0x320021, cbfrsynra=0x420, cb=5 arm-smmu c600000.iommu: FSR = 00000402 [Format=2 TF], SID=0x420 arm-smmu c600000.iommu: FSYNR0 = 00320021 [S1CBNDX=50 PNU PLVL=1] arm-smmu c600000.iommu: Unhandled context fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x5c0d7800, fsynr=0x320021, cbfrsynra=0x420, cb=5 arm-smmu c600000.iommu: FSR = 00000402 [Format=2 TF], SID=0x420 and also failed initialisation of lontium lt9611uxc, gpu and dpu is observed: (binding MDSS components triggered by lt9611uxc have failed) ------------[ cut here ]------------ !aspace WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 324 at drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_vma.c:130 msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] Modules linked in: ... (long list of modules) CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 324 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.15.0-03037-gaacc73ceeb8b #4 PREEMPT Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. QRB4210 RB2 (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] lr : msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] sp : ffff80008144b280 ... Call trace: msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] (P) get_vma_locked+0xc0/0x194 [msm] msm_gem_get_and_pin_iova_range+0x4c/0xdc [msm] msm_gem_kernel_new+0x48/0x160 [msm] msm_gpu_init+0x34c/0x53c [msm] adreno_gpu_init+0x1b0/0x2d8 [msm] a6xx_gpu_init+0x1e8/0x9e0 [msm] adreno_bind+0x2b8/0x348 [msm] component_bind_all+0x100/0x230 msm_drm_bind+0x13c/0x3d0 [msm] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x164/0x1d0 __component_add+0xa4/0x174 component_add+0x14/0x20 dsi_dev_attach+0x20/0x34 [msm] dsi_host_attach+0x58/0x98 [msm] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x90 lt9611uxc_attach_dsi.isra.0+0x94/0x124 [lontium_lt9611uxc] lt9611uxc_probe+0x540/0x5fc [lontium_lt9611uxc] i2c_device_probe+0x148/0x2a8 really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120 driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 __driver_attach+0x90/0x1a0 bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb8 driver_attach+0x24/0x30 bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 driver_register+0x68/0x124 i2c_register_driver+0x48/0xcc lt9611uxc_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [lontium_lt9611uxc] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d4 do_init_module+0x54/0x1fc load_module+0x1748/0x1c8c init_module_from_file+0x74/0xa0 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x130/0x2f8 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x2c/0x80 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: [drm:msm_gpu_init [msm]] *ERROR* could not allocate memptrs: -22 msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: failed to load adreno gpu platform a400000.remoteproc:glink-edge:apr:service@7:dais: Adding to iommu group 19 msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: failed to bind 5900000.gpu (ops a3xx_ops [msm]): -22 msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: adev bind failed: -22 lt9611uxc 0-002b: failed to attach dsi to host lt9611uxc 0-002b: probe with driver lt9611uxc failed with error -22 Suggested-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Fixes: 3581b70 ("drm/msm/disp/dpu1: add support for display on SM6115") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <alexey.klimov@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613173238.15061-1-alexey.klimov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue. Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818054618.41615-1-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d9cef55 ] BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue. Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818054618.41615-1-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-26880 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.28.1.el9_4 commit-author Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> commit 65e8fbd There is this reported crash when experimenting with the lvm2 testsuite. The list corruption is caused by the fact that the postsuspend and resume methods were not paired correctly; there were two consecutive calls to the origin_postsuspend function. The second call attempts to remove the "hash_list" entry from a list, while it was already removed by the first call. Fix __dm_internal_resume so that it calls the preresume and resume methods of the table's targets. If a preresume method of some target fails, we are in a tricky situation. We can't return an error because dm_internal_resume isn't supposed to return errors. We can't return success, because then the "resume" and "postsuspend" methods would not be paired correctly. So, we set the DMF_SUSPENDED flag and we fake normal suspend - it may confuse userspace tools, but it won't cause a kernel crash. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 8343 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6 #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 <snip> RSP: 0018:ffff8881b831bcc0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff888143b6eb80 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff819053d0 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff8881b83a3400 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: 0000000000000058 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff81a24080 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff88814538e000 R14: ffff888143bc6dc0 R15: ffffffffa02e4bb0 FS: 00000000f7c0f780(0000) GS:ffff8893f0a40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000057fb5000 CR3: 0000000143474000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x2d/0x80 ? do_trap+0xeb/0xf0 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 ? do_error_trap+0x60/0x80 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x49/0x60 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 origin_postsuspend+0x1a/0x50 [dm_snapshot] dm_table_postsuspend_targets+0x34/0x50 [dm_mod] dm_suspend+0xd8/0xf0 [dm_mod] dev_suspend+0x1f2/0x2f0 [dm_mod] ? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod] ctl_ioctl+0x300/0x5f0 [dm_mod] dm_compat_ctl_ioctl+0x7/0x10 [dm_mod] __x64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x104/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x184/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e RIP: 0033:0xf7e6aead <snip> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: ffcc393 ("dm: enhance internal suspend and resume interface") Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 65e8fbd) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
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jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-38540 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.33.1.el9_4 commit-author Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> commit 78cfd17 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-427.33.1.el9_4/78cfd171.failed Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called with hwq_attr->aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr->aux_stride == 0. In that case, "roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr->aux_stride)" gets called. roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0. Fix it in the one caller that had this combination. The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4 Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - servis@abacus.cz Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec __roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0 ? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core] create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core] add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core] enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core] ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80 ? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0 really_probe+0xde/0x340 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0 bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220 driver_register+0x72/0xd0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0 ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310 do_init_module+0x90/0x250 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0 R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 0c4dcd6 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Refactor hardware queue memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507103929.30003-1-mschmidt@redhat.com Acked-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 78cfd17) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c
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jira LE-2015 cve CVE-2024-40904 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.42.1.el9_4 commit-author Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> commit 22f0081 The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup: cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71 cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625] CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup: #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 73096 hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994 hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588 CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time. In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with dev_err_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Suggested-by: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5f996b83575ef4058638@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/00000000000073d54b061a6a1c65@google.com/ Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1b2abad17596ad03dcff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/000000000000f45085061aa9b37e@google.com/ Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/40dfa45b-5f21-4eef-a8c1-51a2f320e267@rowland.harvard.edu/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/29855215-52f5-4385-b058-91f42c2bee18@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 22f0081) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
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These iterations require the read lock, otherwise RCU lockdep will splat: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 Tainted: G O ----------------------------- drivers/base/power/main.c:1333 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by rtcwake/547: #0: 00000000643ab418 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: file_start_write+0x2b/0x3a #1: 0000000067a0ca88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x181/0x24b #2: 00000000631eac40 (kn->active#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x191/0x24b #3: 00000000609a1308 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0xaf/0x30b #4: 0000000060c0fdb0 (device_links_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: device_links_read_lock+0x75/0x98 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 547 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G O 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Stack: 223721b3a80 6089eac6 00000001 00000001 ffffff00 6089eac6 00000535 6086e528 721b3ac0 6003c294 00000000 60031fc0 Call Trace: [<600407ed>] show_stack+0x10e/0x127 [<6003c294>] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xc6 [<6003c2fd>] dump_stack+0x1a/0x20 [<600bc2f8>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x116/0x13e [<603d8ea1>] dpm_async_suspend_superior+0x117/0x17e [<603d980f>] device_suspend+0x528/0x541 [<603da24b>] dpm_suspend+0x1a2/0x267 [<603da837>] dpm_suspend_start+0x5d/0x72 [<600ca0c9>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xab/0x736 [...] Add the fourth argument to the iteration to annotate this and avoid the splat. Fixes: 0679963 ("PM: sleep: Make async suspend handle suppliers like parents") Fixes: ed18738 ("PM: sleep: Make async resume handle consumers like children") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826134348.aba79f6e6299.I9ecf55da46ccf33778f2c018a82e1819d815b348@changeid Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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… context JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-102691 commit 9ca7a42 Author: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Date: Wed, 28 May 2025 09:49:43 +0100 The current use of a mutex to protect the notifier hashtable accesses can lead to issues in the atomic context. It results in the below kernel warnings: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:258 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/0:0 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.14.0 #4 | Workqueue: ffa_pcpu_irq_notification notif_pcpu_irq_work_fn | Call trace: | show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) | dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | __might_resched+0x114/0x170 | __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 | mutex_lock+0x24/0x80 | handle_notif_callbacks+0x54/0xe0 | notif_get_and_handle+0x40/0x88 | generic_exec_single+0x80/0xc0 | smp_call_function_single+0xfc/0x1a0 | notif_pcpu_irq_work_fn+0x2c/0x38 | process_one_work+0x14c/0x2b4 | worker_thread+0x2e4/0x3e0 | kthread+0x13c/0x210 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 To address this, replace the mutex with an rwlock to protect the notifier hashtable accesses. This ensures that read-side locking does not sleep and multiple readers can acquire the lock concurrently, avoiding unnecessary contention and potential deadlocks. Writer access remains exclusive, preserving correctness. This change resolves warnings from lockdep about potential sleep in atomic context. Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Reported-by: Jérôme Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org> Closes: OP-TEE/optee_os#7394 Fixes: e057344 ("firmware: arm_ffa: Add interfaces to request notification callbacks") Message-Id: <20250528-ffa_notif_fix-v1-3-5ed7bc7f8437@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marcin Juszkiewicz <mjuszkiewicz@redhat.com>
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…mplaint JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-36251 commit bbaa6ff Author: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Date: Wed Sep 13 11:32:33 2023 +0800 AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning: [ 196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! [ 196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec [ 196.159970] drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid [ 196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4 [ 196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023 [ 196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work [ 196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c [ 196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000 [ 196.160495] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 196.160504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 196.160520] PKRU: 55555554 [ 196.160526] Call Trace: [ 196.160532] <TASK> [ 196.160548] ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 [ 196.160570] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160580] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 [ 196.160600] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160613] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 [ 196.160637] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 [ 196.160658] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 [ 196.160675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 [ 196.160709] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160727] __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0 [ 196.160746] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160765] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160778] ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270 [ 196.160806] schedule+0x68/0x110 [ 196.160820] schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160 [ 196.160829] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160842] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160855] ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90 [ 196.160878] __down_common+0xff/0x220 [ 196.160905] __down_timeout+0x16/0x30 [ 196.160920] down_timeout+0x64/0x70 [ 196.160938] acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200 [ 196.160959] acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280 [ 196.160979] acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0 [ 196.160992] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0 [ 196.161005] acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490 [ 196.161018] ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0 [ 196.161038] acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0 [ 196.161055] ? kfree+0x79/0x120 [ 196.161071] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161089] acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161110] get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70 [ 196.161127] ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161146] __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0 [ 196.161166] class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160 [ 196.161184] ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161203] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161223] power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70 [ 196.161243] amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161276] amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161310] amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161340] notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0 [ 196.161362] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60 [ 196.161378] power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110 [ 196.161394] process_one_work+0x178/0x360 [ 196.161412] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161424] worker_thread+0x307/0x430 [ 196.161440] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161451] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 196.161467] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161486] ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70 [ 196.161502] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161518] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 196.161558] </TASK> [ 196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the constraint. Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Reported-by: Allen Zhong <allen@atr.me> Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571 Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913033233.602986-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com>
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Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 ctrliq#8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 ctrliq#9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 ctrliq#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com
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The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail
to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the
workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the
test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events
fails.
Before:
```
$ perf test -vv 7
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 1189568
Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
exclude_kernel 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
exclude_kernel 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3
Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/
..after resolving event: software/config=0/
cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
size 136
config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY)
sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU
read_format ID|LOST
disabled 1
inherit 1
mmap 1
comm 1
enable_on_exec 1
task 1
sample_id_all 1
mmap2 1
comm_exec 1
ksymbol 1
bpf_event 1
{ wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
perf_evlist__open: Permission denied
---- end(-2) ----
Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]'
---- unexpected signal (6) ----
iFailed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
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#0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311
#1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44
#3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27
#4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81
#5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226
#6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344
#7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128
ctrliq#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545
ctrliq#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647
ctrliq#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849
ctrliq#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349
ctrliq#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
ctrliq#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448
ctrliq#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555
ctrliq#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
ctrliq#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
ctrliq#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1]
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED!
```
After:
```
$ perf test 7
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions)
```
Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <ctshao@google.com>
Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Oct 17, 2025
Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev
mutex if the device needs it.
If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than
lockdep can handle:
unshare -n \
bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done'
BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48 max: 48!
48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69:
#0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net
#3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch
#4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify
[..]
Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices.
Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always
removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd
remain in locked state.
Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we
processed entire list without hitting the limit.
Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251013185052.14021-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Oct 21, 2025
[ Upstream commit 48918ca ] The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 ctrliq#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 ctrliq#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 ctrliq#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 ctrliq#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 ctrliq#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 ctrliq#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 ctrliq#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 ctrliq#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 ctrliq#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 ctrliq#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <ctshao@google.com> Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 0570327 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 ctrliq#8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 ctrliq#9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 ctrliq#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit ffa1e7a Author: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue Mar 18 10:55:48 2025 +0100 block: Make request_queue lockdep splats show up earlier In recent kernels, there are lockdep splats around the struct request_queue::io_lockdep_map, similar to [1], but they typically don't show up until reclaim with writeback happens. Having multiple kernel versions released with a known risc of kernel deadlock during reclaim writeback should IMHO be addressed and backported to -stable with the highest priority. In order to have these lockdep splats show up earlier, preferrably during system initialization, prime the struct request_queue::io_lockdep_map as GFP_KERNEL reclaim- tainted. This will instead lead to lockdep splats looking similar to [2], but without the need for reclaim + writeback happening. [1]: [ 189.762244] ====================================================== [ 189.762432] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 189.762441] 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #6 Tainted: G U [ 189.762450] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 189.762459] kswapd0/119 is trying to acquire lock: [ 189.762467] ffff888110ceb710 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26){++++}-{0:0}, at: __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.762485] but task is already holding lock: [ 189.762494] ffffffff834c97c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xbe/0xb00 [ 189.762507] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 189.762519] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 189.762529] -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 189.762540] fs_reclaim_acquire+0xc5/0x100 [ 189.762548] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x4a/0x480 [ 189.762558] alloc_inode+0xaa/0xe0 [ 189.762566] iget_locked+0x157/0x330 [ 189.762573] kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x110 [ 189.762582] kernfs_get_tree+0x1b0/0x2e0 [ 189.762590] sysfs_get_tree+0x1f/0x60 [ 189.762597] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xf0 [ 189.762605] path_mount+0x4cd/0xc00 [ 189.762613] __x64_sys_mount+0x119/0x150 [ 189.762621] x64_sys_call+0x14f2/0x2310 [ 189.762630] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 189.762637] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 189.762647] -> #1 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 189.762659] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 189.762667] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 189.762676] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 189.762685] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 189.762709] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 189.762716] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 189.762725] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 189.762733] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 189.762756] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 189.762765] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 189.762773] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 189.762781] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 189.762790] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 189.762798] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 189.762807] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 189.762815] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 189.762823] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 189.762833] -> #0 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26){++++}-{0:0}: [ 189.762845] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 189.762854] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 189.762861] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a2/0xba0 [ 189.762870] __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.762878] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.762888] submit_bio_noacct+0x2cc/0x620 [ 189.762896] submit_bio+0x38/0x110 [ 189.762904] __swap_writepage+0xf5/0x380 [ 189.762912] swap_writepage+0x3c7/0x600 [ 189.762920] shmem_writepage+0x3da/0x4f0 [ 189.762929] pageout+0x13f/0x310 [ 189.762937] shrink_folio_list+0x61c/0xf60 [ 189.763261] evict_folios+0x378/0xcd0 [ 189.763584] try_to_shrink_lruvec+0x1b0/0x360 [ 189.763946] shrink_one+0x10e/0x200 [ 189.764266] shrink_node+0xc02/0x1490 [ 189.764586] balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.764934] kswapd+0x1e8/0x430 [ 189.765249] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 189.765559] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 189.765889] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.766198] other info that might help us debug this: [ 189.767089] Chain exists of: &q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26 --> &root->kernfs_rwsem --> fs_reclaim [ 189.767971] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 189.768555] CPU0 CPU1 [ 189.768849] ---- ---- [ 189.769136] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 189.769421] lock(&root->kernfs_rwsem); [ 189.769714] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 189.770016] rlock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26); [ 189.770305] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 189.771167] 1 lock held by kswapd0/119: [ 189.771453] #0: ffffffff834c97c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xbe/0xb00 [ 189.771770] stack backtrace: [ 189.772351] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G U 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #6 [ 189.772353] Tainted: [U]=USER [ 189.772354] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [ 189.772354] Call Trace: [ 189.772355] <TASK> [ 189.772356] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [ 189.772359] dump_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 189.772360] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1b7 [ 189.772363] check_noncircular+0x13a/0x150 [ 189.772365] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772368] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 189.772368] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.772371] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 189.772372] ? __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772375] ? lock_release+0xd5/0x2c0 [ 189.772376] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a2/0xba0 [ 189.772378] ? __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772380] __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772382] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xe0 [ 189.772384] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.772386] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.772387] ? __might_sleep+0x58/0xa0 [ 189.772390] submit_bio_noacct+0x2cc/0x620 [ 189.772391] ? count_memcg_events+0x68/0x90 [ 189.772393] submit_bio+0x38/0x110 [ 189.772395] __swap_writepage+0xf5/0x380 [ 189.772396] swap_writepage+0x3c7/0x600 [ 189.772397] shmem_writepage+0x3da/0x4f0 [ 189.772401] pageout+0x13f/0x310 [ 189.772406] shrink_folio_list+0x61c/0xf60 [ 189.772409] ? isolate_folios+0xe80/0x16b0 [ 189.772410] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [ 189.772412] evict_folios+0x378/0xcd0 [ 189.772414] ? evict_folios+0x34a/0xcd0 [ 189.772415] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [ 189.772417] try_to_shrink_lruvec+0x1b0/0x360 [ 189.772420] shrink_one+0x10e/0x200 [ 189.772421] shrink_node+0xc02/0x1490 [ 189.772423] ? shrink_node+0xa08/0x1490 [ 189.772424] ? shrink_node+0xbd8/0x1490 [ 189.772425] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x366/0x480 [ 189.772427] balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.772428] ? balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.772430] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xe0 [ 189.772431] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xcb/0x330 [ 189.772433] ? __switch_to_asm+0x33/0x70 [ 189.772437] kswapd+0x1e8/0x430 [ 189.772438] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772440] ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772441] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 189.772443] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772444] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 189.772446] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772447] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.772450] </TASK> [2]: [ 8.760253] ====================================================== [ 8.760254] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 8.760255] 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #7 Tainted: G U [ 8.760256] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 8.760257] (udev-worker)/674 is trying to acquire lock: [ 8.760259] ffff888100e39148 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760265] but task is already holding lock: [ 8.760266] ffff888110dc7680 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760272] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 8.760272] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 8.760273] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}: [ 8.760276] blk_alloc_queue+0x30a/0x350 [ 8.760279] blk_mq_alloc_queue+0x6b/0xe0 [ 8.760281] scsi_alloc_sdev+0x276/0x3c0 [ 8.760284] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x22a/0x440 [ 8.760286] __scsi_scan_target+0x109/0x230 [ 8.760288] scsi_scan_channel+0x65/0xc0 [ 8.760290] scsi_scan_host_selected+0xff/0x140 [ 8.760292] do_scsi_scan_host+0xa7/0xc0 [ 8.760293] do_scan_async+0x1c/0x160 [ 8.760295] async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x150 [ 8.760299] process_one_work+0x224/0x5f0 [ 8.760302] worker_thread+0x1d4/0x3e0 [ 8.760304] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 8.760306] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 8.760309] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 8.760312] -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 8.760315] fs_reclaim_acquire+0xc5/0x100 [ 8.760317] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x4a/0x480 [ 8.760319] alloc_inode+0xaa/0xe0 [ 8.760322] iget_locked+0x157/0x330 [ 8.760323] kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x110 [ 8.760325] kernfs_get_tree+0x1b0/0x2e0 [ 8.760327] sysfs_get_tree+0x1f/0x60 [ 8.760329] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xf0 [ 8.760332] path_mount+0x4cd/0xc00 [ 8.760334] __x64_sys_mount+0x119/0x150 [ 8.760336] x64_sys_call+0x14f2/0x2310 [ 8.760338] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760340] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760342] -> #0 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 8.760345] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 8.760347] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760348] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 8.760350] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760351] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 8.760353] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 8.760355] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 8.760356] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 8.760358] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 8.760360] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 8.760362] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 8.760364] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 8.760366] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 8.760367] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 8.760370] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760372] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 8.760374] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 8.760376] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760377] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760380] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8.760380] Chain exists of: &root->kernfs_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> &q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27 [ 8.760384] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 8.760384] CPU0 CPU1 [ 8.760385] ---- ---- [ 8.760385] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27); [ 8.760387] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 8.760388] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27); [ 8.760390] lock(&root->kernfs_rwsem); [ 8.760391] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 8.760391] 6 locks held by (udev-worker)/674: [ 8.760392] #0: ffff8881209ac420 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760398] #1: ffff88810c80f488 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x250 [ 8.760402] #2: ffff888125d1d330 (kn->active#101){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x250 [ 8.760406] #3: ffff888110dc7bb0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: queue_attr_store+0x148/0x1e0 [ 8.760411] #4: ffff888110dc7680 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760416] #5: ffff888110dc76b8 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760421] stack backtrace: [ 8.760422] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 674 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G U 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #7 [ 8.760424] Tainted: [U]=USER [ 8.760425] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [ 8.760426] Call Trace: [ 8.760427] <TASK> [ 8.760428] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [ 8.760431] dump_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 8.760433] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1b7 [ 8.760437] check_noncircular+0x13a/0x150 [ 8.760441] ? save_trace+0x54/0x360 [ 8.760445] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 8.760446] ? irqentry_exit+0x3a/0xb0 [ 8.760448] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 8.760452] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760453] ? kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760457] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 8.760459] ? kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760460] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760462] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 8.760464] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 8.760466] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 8.760467] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 8.760470] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 8.760472] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 8.760475] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 8.760479] ? lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760480] ? kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x250 [ 8.760482] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [ 8.760485] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 8.760487] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 8.760489] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 8.760494] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760497] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 8.760499] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 8.760502] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760504] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x5d/0xe0 [ 8.760506] ? handle_softirqs+0x479/0x4d0 [ 8.760508] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x13f/0x280 [ 8.760511] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x8b/0x260 [ 8.760513] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760515] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760516] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760518] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760520] RIP: 0033:0x7aa3bf2f5504 [ 8.760522] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 [ 8.760523] RSP: 002b:00007ffc1e3697d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 8.760526] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007aa3bf2f5504 [ 8.760527] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc1e369ae0 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 8.760528] RBP: 00007ffc1e369800 R08: 00007aa3bf3f51c8 R09: 00007ffc1e3698b0 [ 8.760528] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 8.760529] R13: 00007ffc1e369ae0 R14: 0000613ccf21f2f0 R15: 00007aa3bf3f4e80 [ 8.760533] </TASK> v2: - Update a code comment to increase readability (Ming Lei). Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318095548.5187-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit 9730763 Author: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed Mar 19 16:23:46 2025 +0530 block: correct locking order for protecting blk-wbt parameters The commit '245618f8e45f ("block: protect wbt_lat_usec using q-> elevator_lock")' introduced q->elevator_lock to protect updates to blk-wbt parameters when writing to the sysfs attribute wbt_ lat_usec and the cgroup attribute io.cost.qos. However, both these attributes also acquire q->rq_qos_mutex, leading to the following lockdep warning: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc5+ ctrliq#138 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/5902 is trying to acquire lock: c000000085d495a0 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: wbt_init+0x164/0x238 but task is already holding lock: c000000085d498c8 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: queue_wb_lat_store+0xb0/0x20c which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xf0/0xa58 ioc_qos_write+0x16c/0x85c cgroup_file_write+0xc4/0x32c kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b8/0x29c vfs_write+0x410/0x584 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x134/0x360 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec -> #0 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1b6c/0x2ae0 lock_acquire+0x140/0x430 __mutex_lock+0xf0/0xa58 wbt_init+0x164/0x238 queue_wb_lat_store+0x1dc/0x20c queue_attr_store+0x12c/0x164 sysfs_kf_write+0x6c/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b8/0x29c vfs_write+0x410/0x584 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x134/0x360 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->elevator_lock); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->elevator_lock); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by bash/5902: #0: c000000051122400 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x84/0x140 #1: c00000007383f088 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x174/0x29c #2: c000000008550428 (kn->active#182){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x180/0x29c #3: c000000085d493a8 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#5){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x28/0x40 #4: c000000085d493e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#5){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x28/0x40 #5: c000000085d498c8 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: queue_wb_lat_store+0xb0/0x20c stack backtrace: CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 5902 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ ctrliq#138 Hardware name: IBM,9043-MRX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_028) hv:phyp pSeries Call Trace: [c0000000721ef590] [c00000000118f8a8] dump_stack_lvl+0x108/0x18c (unreliable) [c0000000721ef5c0] [c00000000022563c] print_circular_bug+0x448/0x604 [c0000000721ef670] [c000000000225a44] check_noncircular+0x24c/0x26c [c0000000721ef740] [c00000000022bf28] __lock_acquire+0x1b6c/0x2ae0 [c0000000721ef870] [c000000000229240] lock_acquire+0x140/0x430 [c0000000721ef970] [c0000000011cfbec] __mutex_lock+0xf0/0xa58 [c0000000721efaa0] [c00000000096c46c] wbt_init+0x164/0x238 [c0000000721efaf0] [c0000000008f8cd8] queue_wb_lat_store+0x1dc/0x20c [c0000000721efb50] [c0000000008f8fa0] queue_attr_store+0x12c/0x164 [c0000000721efc60] [c0000000007c11cc] sysfs_kf_write+0x6c/0xb0 [c0000000721efca0] [c0000000007bfa4c] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b8/0x29c [c0000000721efcf0] [c0000000006a281c] vfs_write+0x410/0x584 [c0000000721efdc0] [c0000000006a2cc8] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [c0000000721efe10] [c000000000031b64] system_call_exception+0x134/0x360 [c0000000721efe50] [c00000000000cedc] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec >From the above log it's apparent that method which writes to sysfs attr wbt_lat_usec acquires q->elevator_lock first, and then acquires q->rq_ qos_mutex. However the another method which writes to io.cost.qos, acquires q->rq_qos_mutex first, and then acquires q->rq_qos_mutex. So this could potentially cause the deadlock. A closer look at ioc_qos_write shows that correcting the lock order is non-trivial because q->rq_qos_mutex is acquired in blkg_conf_open_bdev and released in blkg_conf_exit. The function blkg_conf_open_bdev is responsible for parsing user input and finding the corresponding block device (bdev) from the user provided major:minor number. Since we do not know the bdev until blkg_conf_open_bdev completes, we cannot simply move q->elevator_lock acquisition before blkg_conf_open_ bdev. So to address this, we intoduce new helpers blkg_conf_open_bdev_ frozen and blkg_conf_exit_frozen which are just wrappers around blkg_ conf_open_bdev and blkg_conf_exit respectively. The helper blkg_conf_ open_bdev_frozen is similar to blkg_conf_open_bdev, but additionally freezes the queue, acquires q->elevator_lock and ensures the correct locking order is followed between q->elevator_lock and q->rq_qos_mutex. Similarly another helper blkg_conf_exit_frozen in addition to unfreezing the queue ensures that we release the locks in correct order. By using these helpers, now we maintain the same locking order in all code paths where we update blk-wbt parameters. Fixes: 245618f ("block: protect wbt_lat_usec using q->elevator_lock") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202503171650.cc082b66-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319105518.468941-3-nilay@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
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…xit() JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit 78c2713 Author: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Date: Mon May 5 22:18:03 2025 +0800 block: move wbt_enable_default() out of queue freezing from sched ->exit() scheduler's ->exit() is called with queue frozen and elevator lock is held, and wbt_enable_default() can't be called with queue frozen, otherwise the following lockdep warning is triggered: #6 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: #5 (&eq->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#3){++++}-{0:0}: #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: #0 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: Fix the issue by moving wbt_enable_default() out of bfq's exit(), and call it from elevator_change_done(). Meantime add disk->rqos_state_mutex for covering wbt state change, which matches the purpose more than ->elevator_lock. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-26-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
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…ked_roots() If fs_info->super_copy or fs_info->super_for_commit allocated failed in btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), then no need to call btrfs_free_fs_info(). Otherwise btrfs_check_leaked_roots() would access NULL pointer because fs_info->allocated_roots had not been initialised. syzkaller reported the following information: ------------[ cut here ]------------ BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffbb0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 64c9067 P4D 64c9067 PUD 64cb067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1402 Comm: syz.1.35 Not tainted 6.15.8 #4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), (...) RIP: 0010:arch_atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:33 [inline] RIP: 0010:refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:170 [inline] RIP: 0010:btrfs_check_leaked_roots+0x18f/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1230 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_free_fs_info+0x310/0x410 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1280 btrfs_get_tree_subvol+0x592/0x6b0 fs/btrfs/super.c:2029 btrfs_get_tree+0x63/0x80 fs/btrfs/super.c:2097 vfs_get_tree+0x98/0x320 fs/super.c:1759 do_new_mount+0x357/0x660 fs/namespace.c:3899 path_mount+0x716/0x19c0 fs/namespace.c:4226 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4239 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4450 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4427 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x28c/0x310 fs/namespace.c:4427 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f032eaffa8d [...] Fixes: 3bb17a2 ("btrfs: add get_tree callback for new mount API") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+ Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Dewei Meng <mengdewei@cqsoftware.com.cn> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…ked_roots() commit 17679ac upstream. If fs_info->super_copy or fs_info->super_for_commit allocated failed in btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), then no need to call btrfs_free_fs_info(). Otherwise btrfs_check_leaked_roots() would access NULL pointer because fs_info->allocated_roots had not been initialised. syzkaller reported the following information: ------------[ cut here ]------------ BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffbb0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 64c9067 P4D 64c9067 PUD 64cb067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1402 Comm: syz.1.35 Not tainted 6.15.8 #4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), (...) RIP: 0010:arch_atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:33 [inline] RIP: 0010:refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:170 [inline] RIP: 0010:btrfs_check_leaked_roots+0x18f/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1230 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_free_fs_info+0x310/0x410 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1280 btrfs_get_tree_subvol+0x592/0x6b0 fs/btrfs/super.c:2029 btrfs_get_tree+0x63/0x80 fs/btrfs/super.c:2097 vfs_get_tree+0x98/0x320 fs/super.c:1759 do_new_mount+0x357/0x660 fs/namespace.c:3899 path_mount+0x716/0x19c0 fs/namespace.c:4226 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4239 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4450 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4427 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x28c/0x310 fs/namespace.c:4427 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f032eaffa8d [...] Fixes: 3bb17a2 ("btrfs: add get_tree callback for new mount API") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+ Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Dewei Meng <mengdewei@cqsoftware.com.cn> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Oct 30, 2025
[ Upstream commit a91c809 ] The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [ removed const qualifier from bin_attribute callback parameters ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-105612 commit a9c83a0 Author: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Date: Mon Dec 30 14:15:17 2024 -0700 io_uring/timeout: flush timeouts outside of the timeout lock syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now) raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f ctrliq#29 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock: ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094: #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f ctrliq#29 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work Call trace: show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C) __dump_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80 kthread+0x24c/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the raw timeout spinlock. Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock, split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock. Reported-by: syzbot+b1fc199a40b65d601b65@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
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