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internal/oauthex: address URL attacks in PRM #539
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My guess is that we can't just blanket block everything except http(s), because it's plausible that some servers may want to authenticate using a custom app protocol, but that is a little worrying, since it's not immediately clear to me that those couldn't similarly be used for attacks.
I see this is what other SDKs have done though, so perhaps this is the best option we have. There should at least be a comment here explaining why we block these particular schemes, and why we cannot just only allow http(s).
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I got the list of schemes from https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/pull/877/files#diff-a0fe23c86bd448c6fa4c60fe4d380daa65451fea86a9e760673a5a7c65292e88, line 20. There's no explanation in that PR for where that list comes from. Clearly, they are all suspect, but I don't know if there are other suspect schemes as well. However, the article you cited, https://verialabs.com/blog/from-mcp-to-shell, seems to think that the above PR is sufficient. (See the section called the most impactful fix.}
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Seems fine with me. I think we should document that somewhere though.