Add Support for Custom pg_stat_statements View in Postgres Lineage Ingestion #25104
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…views Co-authored-by: SumanMaharana <59608519+SumanMaharana@users.noreply.github.com>
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Hi there 👋 Thanks for your contribution! The OpenMetadata team will review the PR shortly! Once it has been labeled as Let us know if you need any help! |
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TypeScript types have been updated based on the JSON schema changes in the PR |
harshach
added
the
safe to test
![gitar-bot[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/827041?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| SELECT | ||
| u.usename, | ||
| d.datname database_name, | ||
| s.query query_text, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🚨 Security: SQL injection via unvalidated queryStatementSource parameter
Details
The queryStatementSource configuration value is directly interpolated into SQL queries using Python string formatting ({query_statement_source}) without any validation or sanitization. A malicious user could provide a value like pg_stat_statements; DROP TABLE users; -- which would be directly inserted into the SQL query, potentially allowing arbitrary SQL execution.
Impact: An attacker with access to configuration could execute arbitrary SQL commands against the database, leading to data theft, corruption, or complete database compromise.
Suggested fix: Add input validation to ensure queryStatementSource only contains valid identifier characters (alphanumeric, underscores, dots for schema qualification). Consider using a regex pattern like ^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)*$ in the JSON schema validation:
"queryStatementSource": {
"title": "Query Statement Source",
"description": "...",
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)*$",
"default": "pg_stat_statements"
}Additionally, consider using proper identifier quoting in Python code as a defense-in-depth measure.
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️ Target:
|
| Package | Vulnerability ID | Severity | Installed Version | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core |
CVE-2025-52999 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.12.7 | 2.15.0 |
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core |
CVE-2025-52999 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.13.4 | 2.15.0 |
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
CVE-2022-42003 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.12.7 | 2.12.7.1, 2.13.4.2 |
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
CVE-2022-42004 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.12.7 | 2.12.7.1, 2.13.4 |
com.google.code.gson:gson |
CVE-2022-25647 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.2.4 | 2.8.9 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2021-22569 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.16.1, 3.18.2, 3.19.2 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3509 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3510 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2024-7254 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2021-22569 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.16.1, 3.18.2, 3.19.2 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3509 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3510 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2024-7254 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2 |
com.nimbusds:nimbus-jose-jwt |
CVE-2023-52428 | 🚨 HIGH | 9.8.1 | 9.37.2 |
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp |
CVE-2021-0341 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.12.12 | 4.9.2 |
commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils |
CVE-2025-48734 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.9.4 | 1.11.0 |
commons-io:commons-io |
CVE-2024-47554 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.8.0 | 2.14.0 |
dnsjava:dnsjava |
CVE-2024-25638 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.1.7 | 3.6.0 |
io.netty:netty-codec-http2 |
CVE-2025-55163 | 🚨 HIGH | 4.1.96.Final | 4.2.4.Final, 4.1.124.Final |
io.netty:netty-codec-http2 |
GHSA-xpw8-rcwv-8f8p | 🚨 HIGH | 4.1.96.Final | 4.1.100.Final |
io.netty:netty-handler |
CVE-2025-24970 | 🚨 HIGH | 4.1.96.Final | 4.1.118.Final |
net.minidev:json-smart |
CVE-2021-31684 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.3.2 | 1.3.3, 2.4.4 |
net.minidev:json-smart |
CVE-2023-1370 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.3.2 | 2.4.9 |
org.apache.avro:avro |
CVE-2024-47561 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 1.7.7 | 1.11.4 |
org.apache.avro:avro |
CVE-2023-39410 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.7.7 | 1.11.3 |
org.apache.derby:derby |
CVE-2022-46337 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 10.14.2.0 | 10.14.3, 10.15.2.1, 10.16.1.2, 10.17.1.0 |
org.apache.ivy:ivy |
CVE-2022-46751 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.5.1 | 2.5.2 |
org.apache.mesos:mesos |
CVE-2018-1330 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.4.3 | 1.6.0 |
org.apache.thrift:libthrift |
CVE-2019-0205 | 🚨 HIGH | 0.12.0 | 0.13.0 |
org.apache.thrift:libthrift |
CVE-2020-13949 | 🚨 HIGH | 0.12.0 | 0.14.0 |
org.apache.zookeeper:zookeeper |
CVE-2023-44981 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 3.6.3 | 3.7.2, 3.8.3, 3.9.1 |
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
CVE-2024-13009 | 🚨 HIGH | 9.4.56.v20240826 | 9.4.57.v20241219 |
org.lz4:lz4-java |
CVE-2025-12183 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.8.0 | 1.8.1 |
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: Node.js
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: Python
Vulnerabilities (4)
| Package | Vulnerability ID | Severity | Installed Version | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
starlette |
CVE-2025-62727 | 🚨 HIGH | 0.48.0 | 0.49.1 |
urllib3 |
CVE-2025-66418 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.26.20 | 2.6.0 |
urllib3 |
CVE-2025-66471 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.26.20 | 2.6.0 |
urllib3 |
CVE-2026-21441 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.26.20 | 2.6.3 |
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/extended_sample_data.yaml
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/lineage.yaml
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/sample_data.json
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/sample_data.yaml
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/sample_data_aut.yaml
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/sample_usage.json
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/sample_usage.yaml
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /ingestion/pipelines/sample_usage_aut.yaml
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️ Target:
|
| Package | Vulnerability ID | Severity | Installed Version | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core |
CVE-2025-52999 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.12.7 | 2.15.0 |
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core |
CVE-2025-52999 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.13.4 | 2.15.0 |
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
CVE-2022-42003 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.12.7 | 2.12.7.1, 2.13.4.2 |
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
CVE-2022-42004 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.12.7 | 2.12.7.1, 2.13.4 |
com.google.code.gson:gson |
CVE-2022-25647 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.2.4 | 2.8.9 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2021-22569 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.16.1, 3.18.2, 3.19.2 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3509 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3510 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2024-7254 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.3.0 | 3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2021-22569 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.16.1, 3.18.2, 3.19.2 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3509 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2022-3510 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 |
com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java |
CVE-2024-7254 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.7.1 | 3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2 |
com.nimbusds:nimbus-jose-jwt |
CVE-2023-52428 | 🚨 HIGH | 9.8.1 | 9.37.2 |
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp |
CVE-2021-0341 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.12.12 | 4.9.2 |
commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils |
CVE-2025-48734 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.9.4 | 1.11.0 |
commons-io:commons-io |
CVE-2024-47554 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.8.0 | 2.14.0 |
dnsjava:dnsjava |
CVE-2024-25638 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.1.7 | 3.6.0 |
io.netty:netty-codec-http2 |
CVE-2025-55163 | 🚨 HIGH | 4.1.96.Final | 4.2.4.Final, 4.1.124.Final |
io.netty:netty-codec-http2 |
GHSA-xpw8-rcwv-8f8p | 🚨 HIGH | 4.1.96.Final | 4.1.100.Final |
io.netty:netty-handler |
CVE-2025-24970 | 🚨 HIGH | 4.1.96.Final | 4.1.118.Final |
net.minidev:json-smart |
CVE-2021-31684 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.3.2 | 1.3.3, 2.4.4 |
net.minidev:json-smart |
CVE-2023-1370 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.3.2 | 2.4.9 |
org.apache.avro:avro |
CVE-2024-47561 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 1.7.7 | 1.11.4 |
org.apache.avro:avro |
CVE-2023-39410 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.7.7 | 1.11.3 |
org.apache.derby:derby |
CVE-2022-46337 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 10.14.2.0 | 10.14.3, 10.15.2.1, 10.16.1.2, 10.17.1.0 |
org.apache.ivy:ivy |
CVE-2022-46751 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.5.1 | 2.5.2 |
org.apache.mesos:mesos |
CVE-2018-1330 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.4.3 | 1.6.0 |
org.apache.thrift:libthrift |
CVE-2019-0205 | 🚨 HIGH | 0.12.0 | 0.13.0 |
org.apache.thrift:libthrift |
CVE-2020-13949 | 🚨 HIGH | 0.12.0 | 0.14.0 |
org.apache.zookeeper:zookeeper |
CVE-2023-44981 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 3.6.3 | 3.7.2, 3.8.3, 3.9.1 |
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
CVE-2024-13009 | 🚨 HIGH | 9.4.56.v20240826 | 9.4.57.v20241219 |
org.lz4:lz4-java |
CVE-2025-12183 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.8.0 | 1.8.1 |
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: Node.js
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: Python
Vulnerabilities (9)
| Package | Vulnerability ID | Severity | Installed Version | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Werkzeug |
CVE-2024-34069 | 🚨 HIGH | 2.2.3 | 3.0.3 |
aiohttp |
CVE-2025-69223 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.12.12 | 3.13.3 |
aiohttp |
CVE-2025-69223 | 🚨 HIGH | 3.13.2 | 3.13.3 |
deepdiff |
CVE-2025-58367 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 7.0.1 | 8.6.1 |
ray |
CVE-2025-62593 | 🔥 CRITICAL | 2.47.1 | 2.52.0 |
starlette |
CVE-2025-62727 | 🚨 HIGH | 0.48.0 | 0.49.1 |
urllib3 |
CVE-2025-66418 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.26.20 | 2.6.0 |
urllib3 |
CVE-2025-66471 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.26.20 | 2.6.0 |
urllib3 |
CVE-2026-21441 | 🚨 HIGH | 1.26.20 | 2.6.3 |
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
No Vulnerabilities Found
🛡️ TRIVY SCAN RESULT 🛡️
Target: /home/airflow/openmetadata-airflow-apis/openmetadata_managed_apis.egg-info/PKG-INFO
No Vulnerabilities Found
Jest test CoverageUI tests summary
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| u.usename, | ||
| d.datname database_name, | ||
| s.query query_text, | ||
| s.{time_column_name} duration |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🚨 Security: SQL injection via unvalidated queryStatementSource parameter
Details
The queryStatementSource configuration parameter is directly interpolated into SQL queries without any validation or sanitization. This creates a SQL injection vulnerability where a malicious user could execute arbitrary SQL commands.
Impact:
- A malicious actor with configuration access could inject arbitrary SQL like
pg_stat_statements; DROP TABLE users; --or use UNION-based attacks to extract sensitive data - This could lead to data exfiltration, data modification, or denial of service
Locations affected:
queries.pyline 22-24:{query_statement_source}in POSTGRES_SQL_STATEMENTqueries.pyline 140:{query_statement_source}in POSTGRES_TEST_GET_QUERIESconnection.pyline 9-10: Passing unvalidated value to query formatquery_parser.pyline 44-45: Passing unvalidated value to query format
Suggested fix:
- Add a validation pattern to the JSON schema to restrict input to valid SQL identifiers:
"queryStatementSource": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$",
"default": "pg_stat_statements"
}- Additionally, validate/sanitize the value in Python before use:
import re
def validate_query_source(source: str) -> str:
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$', source):
raise ValueError(f"Invalid query statement source: {source}")
return sourceThis mirrors security patterns used elsewhere for similar configurable SQL identifiers.
| u.usename, | ||
| d.datname database_name, | ||
| s.query query_text, | ||
| s.{time_column_name} duration |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🚨 Security: SQL injection via unvalidated queryStatementSource parameter
Details
The queryStatementSource parameter is directly interpolated into SQL queries via Python's .format() method without any validation or sanitization. This creates a SQL injection vulnerability.
Attack vector:
A user could provide a malicious value like:
"queryStatementSource": "pg_stat_statements; DROP TABLE users; --"
Impact:
- Remote code execution via SQL injection
- Data exfiltration, modification, or deletion
- Complete database compromise
Affected code:
queries.pyline 22:{query_statement_source} sinPOSTGRES_SQL_STATEMENTqueries.pyline 140:{query_statement_source} sinPOSTGRES_TEST_GET_QUERIES- The JSON schema at
postgresConnection.jsonline 109 defines the field as a plain string with no pattern validation
Recommended fix:
- Add a strict regex pattern in the JSON schema to only allow valid SQL identifiers:
"queryStatementSource": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$",
"default": "pg_stat_statements"
}- Additionally, add server-side validation in Python to double-check the format before interpolation:
import re
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$', query_statement_source):
raise ValueError("Invalid queryStatementSource format")This mirrors security patterns used in other database connectors that accept table/view names as configuration.
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@copilot lets add tests for the changes made in test_postgres.py |
Tests for the
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🔍 CI failure analysis for b14e8cf: Both CI failures (maven-postgresql-ci and maven-sonarcloud-ci) are caused by the same infrastructure issue - GitHub Actions runners ran out of disk space.IssueMultiple CI jobs failed due to disk space exhaustion on GitHub Actions runners:
Root CauseBoth jobs started around the same time (2026-01-09 18:19:31-32 UTC) and failed with identical error signatures. The runners' disks filled up during job execution, causing system failures with DetailsThese are infrastructure failures, not code issues. The failures occurred in the GitHub Actions runner system itself before any actual test execution or code compilation could be properly logged. The error manifests in the runner's internal logging system, indicating the runner environments ran out of available disk space. The fact that multiple jobs failed simultaneously with identical errors suggests either:
This type of failure is typically caused by:
Code Review 👍 Approved with suggestions 0 resolved / 3 findingsWell-structured feature addition that follows existing patterns. The SQL injection concern from previous findings remains valid but represents an existing codebase pattern rather than a new vulnerability introduced by this PR. 🚨 Security: SQL injection via unvalidated queryStatementSource parameter📄 ingestion/src/metadata/ingestion/source/database/postgres/queries.py:22 📄 ingestion/src/metadata/ingestion/source/database/postgres/queries.py:140 📄 openmetadata-spec/src/main/resources/json/schema/entity/services/connections/database/postgresConnection.json:109 🔗 CWE-89: SQL Injection The Impact:
Locations affected:
Suggested fix:
"queryStatementSource": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$",
"default": "pg_stat_statements"
}
import re
def validate_query_source(source: str) -> str:
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$', source):
raise ValueError(f"Invalid query statement source: {source}")
return sourceThis mirrors security patterns used elsewhere for similar configurable SQL identifiers. 🚨 Security: SQL injection via unvalidated queryStatementSource parameter📄 ingestion/src/metadata/ingestion/source/database/postgres/queries.py:22 📄 ingestion/src/metadata/ingestion/source/database/postgres/queries.py:140 📄 openmetadata-spec/src/main/resources/json/schema/entity/services/connections/database/postgresConnection.json:109 🔗 CWE-89: SQL Injection The Impact: An attacker with access to configuration could execute arbitrary SQL commands against the database, leading to data theft, corruption, or complete database compromise. Suggested fix: Add input validation to ensure "queryStatementSource": {
"title": "Query Statement Source",
"description": "...",
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)*$",
"default": "pg_stat_statements"
}Additionally, consider using proper identifier quoting in Python code as a defense-in-depth measure. 🚨 Security: SQL injection via unvalidated queryStatementSource parameter📄 ingestion/src/metadata/ingestion/source/database/postgres/queries.py:22 📄 ingestion/src/metadata/ingestion/source/database/postgres/queries.py:140 📄 openmetadata-spec/src/main/resources/json/schema/entity/services/connections/database/postgresConnection.json:109 🔗 CWE-89: SQL Injection The Attack vector: Impact:
Affected code:
Recommended fix:
"queryStatementSource": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$",
"default": "pg_stat_statements"
}
import re
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$', query_statement_source):
raise ValueError("Invalid queryStatementSource format")This mirrors security patterns used in other database connectors that accept table/view names as configuration. What Works WellClean implementation that mirrors the Snowflake connector's RecommendationsConsider adding a regex validation pattern in the JSON schema to restrict Tip Comment OptionsAuto-apply is off Gitar will not commit updates to this branch. Comment with these commands to change:
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Describe your changes:
Adds
queryStatementSourceconfiguration property to Postgres and Timescale connectors, allowing users to specify a custom view/table for query logs instead of the defaultpg_stat_statements. This supports deployments that exposepg_stat_statementsthrough a custom view for security policy compliance.Changes:
queryStatementSourceproperty topostgresConnection.jsonandtimescaleConnection.jsonschemas (default:pg_stat_statements)POSTGRES_SQL_STATEMENTandPOSTGRES_TEST_GET_QUERIESto use{query_statement_source}placeholderPostgresQueryParserSource.get_sql_statement()and connection test methods to pass the configured sourcePostgres.mdandTimescale.mdExample configuration:
{ "type": "Postgres", "username": "user", "hostPort": "localhost:5432", "database": "postgres", "queryStatementSource": "my_schema.custom_pg_stat_statements" }This mirrors the existing pattern in the Snowflake connector (
accountUsageSchema).Type of change:
Checklist:
Fixes <issue-number>: <short explanation>or decision-making process is reflected in the issue.
Note on migrations: No migration script needed - this adds a new optional property with a default value that preserves existing behavior.
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www.antlr.org/usr/bin/curl curl -O REDACTED(dns block)If you need me to access, download, or install something from one of these locations, you can either:
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