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# RFC: Role-Based Access Control | ||||||
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- Feature Name: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) | ||||||
- Start Date: 2024-11-12 | ||||||
- Author: @cbbayburt | ||||||
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# Summary | ||||||
[summary]: #summary | ||||||
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This RFC proposes implementing role-based access control (RBAC) in Uyuni to meet users' needs for fine-grained access control and configuration. | ||||||
The solution is extensible, integrates with existing features of the codebase, and is independent of the ongoing efforts to migrate from the Struts framework. | ||||||
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# Motivation | ||||||
[motivation]: #motivation | ||||||
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Currently, access control rules are defined by static role information and controlled individually within each action. | ||||||
By default, each new feature must define its own access rules; if no rules are explicitly defined, the feature is available to all authenticated users. | ||||||
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This proposal moves access control rules to a centrally managed location. | ||||||
The code implementation is generic and relies on configurable access policy definitions, allowing new use cases and rule definitions to be addressed through configuration rather than code changes. | ||||||
The Uyuni Server deploys with sensible defaults and enables users to define custom access policies (user access groups) to meet their specific needs. | ||||||
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The goal of access control is to answer the following question: "Can user U perform operation O on resource R?" | ||||||
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Access control operates on three distinct levels, each with specific goals and constraints: | ||||||
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1. **Authentication:** Identifies the user calling this action. | ||||||
2. **Authorization:** Determines if the user is allowed to call the endpoints for this action. | ||||||
3. **Accounting:** Assesses whether the user is permitted to operate on a specific entity. | ||||||
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This proposal specifically addresses level 2, authorization. | ||||||
Level 1 is managed through the authentication filter, and level 3 is handled within each feature implementation, thus falling outside the scope of this RFC. | ||||||
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# Detailed design | ||||||
[design]: #detailed-design | ||||||
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## Overview | ||||||
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This solution stores all available network endpoints in the database and determines which endpoints each user can access, with the exception of the **Uyuni Administrator** role, which bypasses access control. | ||||||
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This solution stores all available network endpoints in the database and determines which endpoints each user can access, with the exception of the **Uyuni Administrator** role, which bypasses access control. | |
This solution stores all available system endpoints in the database and determines which endpoints each user can access, except the **Uyuni Administrator** role, which bypasses access control. |
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I know we are not discussing implementation details here, but seeing the ER diagram I can't help myself.
Please NO NUMERIC IDs, I can't stress this enough.
Use BIGINT with identity generated always. Exception being already existing IDs.
And btw. VARCHAR is the same as TEXT in postgres, so use TEXT everywhere.
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Noted. Thanks for the tip.
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Will this be required field or optional? What will we have in case of struts actions ?
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This is mandatory, especially for the XML-RPC API endpoint, where we use this field to control access. For Structs and spark-only endpoints this is not really needed, but we can populate it.
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I think we should add 2 more fields to the table, one expressing if the endpoint needs authentication and another if authorization is required.
In the PoC this was implemented as a static list on Java side, but I think we could move this information to the database.
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I'll add a auth_required
column to the RFC to exclude the URLs outside of authentication space (like login, about, API docs, etc.).
I'm not 100% sure about the second flag. It may or may not be needed, depending on the details of the implementation. So I'll leave it out for now.
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How will we make sure that we don't miss endpoints which are not part of any namespace? my question is more going forward - will we have any tooling which identify this?
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We can develop a tool. But the side effect will be super visible, because users will not be able to access the base and feature will not work.
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So when you're implementing a new URL for a feature, first thing you'll have to do is to add necessary entries (endpoint and namespace info) to the RBAC tables using schema migration. Otherwise you won't be able to visit the URL when testing yourself.
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I support the idea of Abid to have some kind of tool part of the unit tests that assure that we don't miss any. Let's not rely only to the side effect even if easy to see. But let's be sure that someone adding a new endpoint in a new Pull Request have feedback if that part is missing.
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can an end point be part of more than 1 namespace?
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yes
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We have many cases already. Mostly with some reusable URLs like getting a JSON system list etc. This also aligns with the fact that we want to unify API endpoints to be used by both the public API and the frontend pages.
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We'll be able to identify if an endpoint is called for one or other namespace?
I'm thinking about telemetry from the point of view of our features.
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From telemetry is not possible o see, we can only see that and endpoint is called. What we can do is we log all the called, be able to calculate a call trace and deduct what could have be the interaction path.
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I believe actions like export CSV will go under view(R) and delete under W, right?
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I think that is the goal, but Can can give more insides if needed.
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Correct. AFAICS this separation is clear enough for any action. Management UI will provide proper descriptions for each namespace and mode so it'll be clear to users.
Ideally, the UI should have free text search so for example you'll be able to search for the keyword CSV and see what namespaces are available for any CSV related action.
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I think we can also add a flag to define if the namespace is tailored to be used from the Web application side of API (XML-RPC side), similar of what we have in the endpoint. I know we can play around with the namespace prefix, but this way would be more explicit.
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We don't have any table to represent this in our sample database schema, right? will we have some kind of inheritance here that if I have access at the top level namespace, I get access to everything else. And if yes, can as an admin, still change it to be more granular.
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If I got it right, the idea is to have this in an indirect way, by playing with the label name. For example:
namespace: admin
namespace: admin.createUser
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If I got it right, the idea is to have this in an indirect way, by playing with the label name.
Correct. By default, granting access to a parent namespace doesn't automatically give access to the children. For that, you'll need to explicitly say "grant access to this namespace and everything that falls below it".
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This "vendor" groups cannot be changed by the users.
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I'm not sure about this topic. We must create access groups mapping the existing roles, that is a must.
However, some of these roles need to stay around for a longer time, even if we remove struts, since they grant access to data and not just features: "Uyuni Administrator" and "Organization administrator" (not 100% sure about the remaining).
For the ones that don't grant access to data, we could try to remove them. The part that can be tricky is the struts ACL rules, which may stop working properly.
An alternative solution for the roles that don't grant data access, and avoid touching the struts ACL could be assign those roles to all users, since the access control to the features will happen in the next mechanism.
We also must develop a automatic migration mechanism from the old roles to the new user access groups.
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What do you mean by data access?
An alternative solution for the roles that don't grant data access, and avoid touching the struts ACL could be assign those roles to all users, since the access control to the features will happen in the next mechanism.
Yes, the problem is that the current access control with static roles is embedded everywhere (React as well) and trying to remove these is going to cost a lot of time. So instead, my plan is to leave them in, hide them from the UI (replaced by the new ones), and assign all these static roles to every existing and future user so they effectively won't do any access control.
However, I'm wondering if we should keep an unrestricted bypass mechanism in the filters for the Uyuni and Org Admin roles like:
public boolean canAccess(User user) {
return (user.hasRole(RoleFactory.ORG_ADMIN) && user.getOrg().equals(getOrg())) ||
user.hasRole(RoleFactory.SAT_ADMIN);
}
or should we rely on RBAC only? Are there some areas that won't be covered by RBAC?
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You can try in the existing implementation. If a user is part of organization and has not roles, and are not assigned to any systems groups, then the user cannot see any system. If the user has the role Org Admin, then it can see all the systems that are part of that organization.
So currently, the roles are not just to control access to pages but also access to data. I can show you tomorrow.
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Oh ok now I get it. So those superuser logic must stay in the new implementation in any case. All the others can go once we're ready to strip their logic from the individual pages.
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hmm, I didn't get this. Here additional permissions means which are not covered by groups or is it more in a sense that those permissions that user got through groups can be overridden by individually assigning to the user?
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The idea is to grant more permissions to the user. User will always have access to all endpoints granted in all the groups, plus all individual permissions grant to the user directly.
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Does this mean that namespaces will be static and administrator cannot change them or create new ones or will we provide the same flexibility(not considering here if that's good or bad) there as well that we are providing here in case of access groups?
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Namespaces and access groups are just different levels of putting endpoints together. Namespaces are static and controled by us. Users can then create user groups linked to the endpoint in any shape or form, that will put together one or more namespaces.
On top of that, we will also have a few user groups controlled by us and the goal is that those groups match the existing roles.
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If Alice got this 'View' access through one accessgroup but then here Alice got that permissions revoked, I expect this would take precedence or?
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As mentioned here:
While administrators can grant individual users additional permissions beyond those provided by their assigned group, they cannot revoke permissions set by the group.
Permissions assigned through a group cannot be revoked individually. This is an arbitrary limitation I wanted to enforce because otherwise it could get really messy for admins after a while. If we see the need for this, we can change the logic to allow this.
So for the example above, you cannot simply make Alice an Image Admin. If you do, you cannot revoke access to cm.store.details
because it's part of the Image Admin role.
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If it's removed from User direct grant but is still present in the group, then Alice still has access to the feature. All endpoints are revoked by default, and we are always adding/grant access in all levels we can configure.
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Small issue: if the rules that apply to a user change while they are logged in, this will lead to a mismatch, how will we address that?
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As first step I think we should not cache any information. We can change that if we notice any performance issue. The topical (as most simple) solution for this kind of situation is that the user must logout and login again.
Another option is to check which sessions are active in the database for user affected by the access change an invalidate those authentication sessions.
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I agree. But when we decide to implement caching, I think safest and easiest solution would be to simply kick the user out and require a new login whenever their permissions change. This shouldn't happen often anyway.
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I would prefer to avoid store procedures as much as possible. They are hard to test and are hidden inside the database.
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I agree. These will be just throwaway tools to help when we're implementing RFC. There's no plan to ship or persist them. Once the API is in place, they won't be needed anyway.
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Spacing throughout the document is inconsistent, can you parse it through https://github.com/DavidAnson/markdownlint ?
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In my opinion, whenever its possible we should have as fine grain as possible, with a separation between the create, update, delete, for example.
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That I would say is part of authentication. However, we could define a mapping between LDAP user groups and suma internal access groups, and automatically assign users to a group at login time.
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That is something we will find out, and we can react according to feedback from customers. One extra groups could be the read-only user that we have now for API only. that can be a new access group and stop relying on method names and a flag on user definition.
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